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Politicians as Fiduciaries: 
Public Law v. Private Law When 
Altering the Date of an Election 
Steven J. Cleveland* 
Abstract 
In the 2019 decision Rucho v. Common Cause, the U.S. 
Supreme Court concluded that federal challenges to partisan 
gerrymandering—a practice yielding election results that 
“reasonably seem unjust”—were non-justiciable. If partisan 
gerrymandering claims are not federally justiciable, and if that 
conclusion emboldens politicians, how else might incumbents 
manipulate election mechanics to preserve their political 
advantage? This Article explores one possibility that was briefly 
mentioned by the Rucho majority: the strategic advancement or 
delay of the date of a federal election. The strategic shift of 
election day is not simply a theoretical problem. Foreign 
politicians have strategically altered their election days for 
partisan advantage, U.S. states have delayed elections to fill 
vacant seats in the Senate, and members of the U.S. Congress 
have repeatedly proposed changing the date of federal elections. 
Because the U.S. Constitution empowers federal legislators 
to establish the date of a federal election, just as the Rucho Court 
emphasized that our charter empowers state legislators to 
establish federal districts, a court may conclude that any 
challenge to a shift in the date of an election is non-justiciable. 
This Article addresses charter provisions not pertinent to 
partisan gerrymandering that limit legislative discretion 
 
 *  Alfred P. Murrah Professor of Law & Thomas P. Hester Presidential 
Professor, University of Oklahoma. 
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regarding a shift in the date of a federal election. Moreover, this 
Article expands on a growing body of scholarship that recognizes 
federal legislators as fiduciaries and that imports principles of 
corporate law to analyze issues of federal election law. Given the 
foundational importance of the shareholder franchise to 
corporate law, courts closely scrutinize decisions by directors 
that impede shareholders’ effective franchise, such as a shift in 
the date that shareholders elect directors. Those corporate law 
principles should inform a court’s analysis of any challenge to a 
shift in the date of a federal election. 
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I.  Introduction 
In the 2019 decision Rucho v. Common Cause,1 the U.S. 
Supreme Court unanimously agreed that “[e]xcessive 
partisanship in districting leads to [election] results that 
reasonably seem unjust.”2 Nonetheless, a majority of the Court 
concluded that legal challenges to raw politics practiced by 
incumbent state politicians, when “cracking” and “packing” that 
portion of the electorate that favored the challenging party, 
“present[ed] political questions beyond the reach of the federal 
courts.”3 If partisan gerrymandering claims are not federally 
justiciable,4 and if that conclusion emboldens politicians,5 how 
else might incumbents manipulate election mechanics to 
preserve their political advantage? This Article explores one 
possibility that was briefly mentioned by the Rucho majority: 
 
 1. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 2. Id. at 2506; see id. at 2507 (“Our conclusion does not condone 
excessive partisan gerrymandering.”); id. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The 
majority disputes none of what I have said (or will say) about how 
gerrymanders undermine democracy. Indeed, the majority concedes (really, 
how could it not?) that gerrymandering is ‘incompatible with democratic 
principles.’” (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 791 (2015))); id. at 2515 (“[T]he majority declares that 
it can do nothing about an acknowledged constitutional violation . . . .”). 
 3. Id. at 2506–07 (majority opinion). 
 4. See id.  
 5. See id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[Partisan gerrymandering] 
encourage[s] a politics of polarization and dysfunction. If left unchecked, 
gerrymanders like the ones here may irreparably damage our system of 
government.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“[I]t is unfortunate that our legislators have reached the point of 
declaring that, when it comes to apportionment: ‘We are in the business of 
rigging elections.’” (quoting John Hoeffel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away 
from Easy Election, WINSTON-SALEM J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B1)); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court Just Abdicated its Most Important Role: 
Enforcing the Constitution, L.A. TIMES (June 27, 2019, 10:19 AM), https://
perma.cc/2VZX-SHVL (“[K]nowing that courts can’t intervene, legislators who 
benefit from partisan gerrymandering will only grow bolder. It is precisely in 
situations like this, where the political process is unlikely to work, that judicial 
enforcement of the Constitution is most important.”).  
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the strategic advancement or delay of the date of a federal 
election.6 
The strategic shift of election day is not simply a theoretical 
problem. Foreign politicians have strategically altered their 
election days for partisan advantage,7 U.S. states have delayed 
elections to fill vacant seats in the Senate,8 and members of 
Congress have repeatedly proposed changing the date of federal 
elections,9 purportedly for partisan advantage.10   
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to establish the 
date of a federal election.11 As emphasized by the Rucho 
majority,12 the U.S. Constitution also empowers state legislators 
 
 6. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495 (“Antifederalists predicted that 
Congress’s power under the Elections Clause would allow Congress to make 
itself ‘omnipotent,’ setting the ‘time’ of elections as never . . . .”); see generally 
Thomas Grove & Georgi Kantchev, Putin Moves to Shore Up Power, as Prime 
Minister Resigns, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/LN2R-FYE6 
(reporting changes intended by Putin that “would limit the power of a 
potential successor after 2024, when he is required by law to step down”). 
 7. See Algerians Protest Bouteflika Decision to Delay Elections, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Dec. 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/JM57-X3TH; Adrian 
Blomfield, Congo Delays Election as Kabila Plots to Keep Power Whatever the 
Result, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 20, 2018, 4:51 PM), https://perma.cc/2YAQ-4KLR; 
Neil Munshi, Nigeria’s Election Delay Sparks Scramble for Digital Reboot, FIN. 
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/F6AT-ZRSN. 
 8. See Zachary D. Clopton & Steven E. Art, The Meaning of the 
Seventeenth Amendment and a Century of State Defiance, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
1181, 1223 (2013) (arguing that “unreasonably delayed elections to fill 
vacancies . . . violated the democratic spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment”). 
 9. See Louise Slaughter Weekend Voting Act, H.R. 5989, 115th Cong. 
(2018) (proposing new dates for federal  elections); S. 1828, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(same); H.R. 1094, 115th Cong. (2017) (same); H.R. 3910, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(same); H.R. 1641, 113th Cong. (2013) (same); H.R. 4183, 112th Cong. (2012) 
(same); S. 149, 111th Cong. (2009) (same); H.R. 254, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(same); S. 2638, 110th Cong. (2008) (same); H.R. 6240, 110th Cong. (2008) 
(same); S. 144, 109th Cong. (2005) (same); S. 1320, 107th Cong. (2001) (same); 
S. 1463, 105th Cong. (1997) (same).   
 10. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Note that a Democrat 
proposed each of the bills cited in the preceding footnote. See Zachary B. Wolf, 
Here’s Why Republicans Don’t Want an Election Day Holiday, CNN (Feb. 1, 
2019, 11:57 AM), https://perma.cc/Q8PB-RAUC. 
 11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.  
 12. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2019) (concluding 
that the Constitution permits state legislators to engage in partisan 
gerrymandering). 
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to establish federal political districts.13 So, any federal challenge 
to a change in the date of a federal election could fail as 
non-justiciable, consistent with Rucho.14 However, while one 
provision of the U.S. Constitution does empower Congress to 
establish the date of federal elections,15 other provisions impose 
limits on that exercise of authority,16 which distinguishes 
Rucho, where there were no limits regarding partisan 
gerrymandering.17 Moreover, a growing body of scholarship 
recognizes politicians as fiduciaries,18 and fiduciary duties may 
further limit incumbents’ ability to manipulate the timing of a 
federal election for partisan advantage.19 This Article expands 
upon that growing body of scholarship and suggests that 
constraints, not present in the gerrymandering context, may 
cabin judicial discretion, rendering justiciable any federal 
challenge to a congressional shift in the date of a federal 
election. Finally, in Rucho, when concluding that the claims 
were not federally justiciable, the majority emphasized the 
availability of relief under state law.20 In contrast, states are left 
powerless when Congress exercises its constitutional authority 
to shift the date for federal elections, further distinguishing 
Rucho.21   
Recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s election-law 
jurisprudence lacks coherence and that its analyses have 
yielded dissatisfying results regarding legislative 
entrenchment, scholars have advocated for the importation of 
 
 13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 14. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2496 (referencing factors to determine 
whether a claim presents a non-justiciable political question).  
 15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 16. See infra Part 0. 
 17. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 (noting that the Court has never held 
partisan gerrymandering unconstitutional). 
 18. See infra Part 0. 
 19. See infra Parts 0, 0, 0. 
 20. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507–08 (referencing how some states have 
addressed partisan gerrymandering). 
 21. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (empowering Congress to establish the date 
of a federal election, preempting any date established under state law); id. art. 
VI (“[T]he laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the 
land . . . .”). 
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analyses from other fields into the election law space. Noting 
the similarities between corporate governance and political 
governance, scholars have extended corporate law analyses into 
election law. This Article extends that line of scholarship to 
address the issue of legislators strategically shifting the date of 
an election. Part II provides background on the regulations 
applicable to corporate elections and federal elections. Part III 
argues that federal politicians should be treated as fiduciaries, 
just as corporate directors are fiduciaries, based upon historical 
and functional analyses. Part IV addresses the fiduciary duties 
to which corporate directors are subject, and how courts review 
alleged breaches of those duties, before extending those 
principles to federal legislators. Part V sets forth the judicial 
analysis used when corporate directors strategically alter the 
date of a shareholder meeting at which directors are elected, and 
the limited situations in which courts apply that analysis, before 
extending those principles to federal legislators. Part VI extends 
that corporate law inquiry to the legislative setting. 
II.  Regulations Regarding the Timing of Elections 
Many election law scholars have shifted their focus from 
general principles of constitutional law to non-constitutional 
legal principles that may provide greater coherence.22 For 
example, by acknowledging “politics as markets,” Samuel 
Issacharoff and Richard Pildes applied antitrust law to 
anticompetitive election laws generated by self-interested 
legislators.23 The duo prompted others to apply economic 
 
 22. See David Schleicher, Overview: Mapping Election Law’s Interior, in 
RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 75, 76 (Guy-Uriel 
E. Charles et al. eds., 2011) (“[T]he goal [of election-law scholarship] was . . . to 
remove the study of the legal aspects of self-governance from general 
constitutional law, because applying ordinary methods in constitutional 
challenges to election rules caused the Supreme Court to develop deeply 
inconsistent, theoretically unmoored election law jurisprudence.”); Richard H. 
Pildes, The Supreme Court 2003 Term—Forward: The Constitutionalization of 
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 40–41 (2004) (“[U]nderstandings of 
individual rights, associational rights, and conceptions of equality must be 
modified to develop an appropriate constitutional framework for the 
increasingly important task of judicial oversight of democratic politics.”).  
 23. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: 
Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 667 (1998). 
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analyses to issues of election law. When analyzing partisan 
gerrymandering by state legislators, D. Theodore Rave applied 
general corporate law principles to those self-interested 
legislators.24 Scholars have emphasized the similarities 
between corporate governance and political governance, 
notwithstanding their differences.25 This Part explores the 
constitutional and statutory limits on corporate directors 
altering the date of their election by shareholders before turning 
to similar limits on federal legislators who might try to alter the 
date of a federal election.   
As a matter of corporate law, directors generally may, 
consistent with governing regulations and corporate documents, 
change the date of the election of directors.26  So too may federal 
legislators, consistent with the text of U.S. Constitution and of 
the U.S. Code, change the date of any federal election.27 
Nonetheless, as will be developed in subsequent sections, 
common law constrains the ability of corporate directors to 
change the date of an election, given looming concerns of 
self-interest and given the shareholders’ voting rights.28 
Similarly, the common law should constrain federal legislators’ 
ability to change the date of a federal election, given looming 
concerns of self-interest and given citizens’ voting rights.  
A.  Corporate Elections 
Neither the U.S. Constitution nor the U.S. Code speaks to 
the timing of the election of corporate directors. Federalism 
allows the states to serve as laboratories experimenting in 
 
 24. See D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
671, 707 (2013). 
 25. See id. at 719; Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: 
Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 845, 870 (2013); Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins 
of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 535 (2006). But see Ethan J. Leib et al., 
Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 94 
(2013) (“[P]olitical relationships and corporate relationships are sufficiently 
different that one should be wary of seamless application from one context to 
the other.”). 
 26. See infra Part 0. 
 27. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.  
 28. See infra Parts 0, 0. 
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corporate law.29 A corporation is a legal entity organized under 
the law of a particular state, and is subsequently regulated by 
that state.30 While state law empowers shareholders to elect 
directors,31 state constitutions and state corporate codes 
generally do not prescribe a particular day for the election of 
corporate directors.32 For example, while the Delaware General 
Corporation Law (DGCL) contemplates an annual election of 
corporate directors, it also empowers the directors to establish 
the date of the election.33 (Because Delaware is the leading 
provider of corporate law, this Article will emphasize its 
corporate law.)34 Aside from public law, a corporation is 
governed by its certificate of incorporation and bylaws.35 A 
corporation’s directors must abide by that corporation’s 
 
 29. See New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments . . . .”). 
 30. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).  
 31. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (West 2020) (“Directors shall be 
elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or 
represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the election of 
directors . . . .”). 
 32. See DEL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1–6 (addressing corporations, but not 
addressing director elections). 
 33. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (“[A]n annual meeting of 
stockholders shall be held for the election of directors on a date and at a time 
designated by or in the manner provided in the bylaws.”); id. § 211(a)(1) 
(“Meetings of stockholders may be held at such place, either within or without 
this State as may be designated by or in the manner provided in the certificate 
of incorporation or bylaws, or if not so designated, as determined by the board 
of directors.”).   
 34. See Steven J. Cleveland, Process Innovation in the Production of 
Corporate Law, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1829, 1832 n.10 (2008) (articulating 
reasons for, and collecting sources regarding, Delaware’s dominance).   
 35. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (“[T]he certificate of 
incorporation may also [set forth] . . . [a]ny provision for the management of 
the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation . . . .”); id. 
§ 109(b) (“The bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or 
with the certificate of incorporation, relating to . . . the rights or powers of its 
stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”). 
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certificate of incorporation and bylaws,36 but those documents 
commonly empower the directors to establish the date on which 
directors will be elected.37 With some regularity, directors will 
establish the date of an election, and, after the occurrence of an 
unexpected event, change the date on which shareholders will 
elect directors.38 
Some states require a corporation’s bylaws to set forth the 
date for the election of directors.39 However, because a 
corporation’s certificate of incorporation commonly empowers 
the board of directors to amend the bylaws,40 the directors of 
those corporations may change the date of the election by 
amending the bylaws.41 As shareholders generally elect 
directors annually, states commonly impose an outside 
parameter by which an election should be convened; and if not 
convened, judicial relief is available.42   
 
 36. See Morgan v. Thornhill, 78 U.S. 65, 72 (1870) (reporting the 
initiation of judicial proceedings when the corporate directors could not comply 
with the corporate charter); 8 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4197, at 803–04 (perm. ed., rev. 
vol. 2010) (“The corporation, and its directors and officers, are bound by and 
must comply with [the bylaws].”). 
 37. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., Bylaws (Form S-1/A), at 1 (Feb. 8, 2012) 
(“The annual meeting of stockholders shall be held on such date, time and 
place, either within or without the State of Delaware, as may be designated 
by resolution of the Board of Directors each year. At the meeting, directors 
shall be elected . . . .”). 
 38. See infra Part 0.  
 39. See In re Tonopah United Water Co., 139 A. 762, 764 (Del. Ch. 1927) 
(citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 1944 (1915)). 
 40. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2020) (“[A]ny corporation 
may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or 
repeal bylaws upon the directors . . . .”); see also Facebook, Inc., Eleventh 
Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation (Form S-1/A), at 21 (Feb. 
8, 2012) (“[T]he Board of Directors of the Corporation is expressly authorized 
to make, alter or repeal the Bylaws of the Corporation.”). 
 41. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) 
(invalidating the directors’ amendment to the bylaws to change the date of the 
election of directors, but not on statutory grounds). 
 42. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c) (West 2020) (“If there be a failure 
to hold the annual meeting . . . for a period of 13 months after . . . its last 
annual meeting . . . , the Court of Chancery may summarily order a meeting 
to be held upon the application of any stockholder or director.”). 
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Thus, either of the following scenarios may occur: (1) A 
corporation’s bylaws empower directors to establish the date on 
which shareholders will elect directors, and the directors, after 
establishing one date for the election, establish a different date 
for the election; or, (2) A corporation’s bylaws establish a date 
on which shareholders will elect directors, and its board of 
directors, exercising authority granted in the certificate of 
incorporation, amend the bylaws to establish a different date for 
the election. Therefore, directors typically may change the date 
of the election consistent with statute and consistent with 
governing corporate documents. So, directors may accelerate an 
election or delay an election within statutory parameters 
without giving rise to statutory relief. However, as fiduciaries, 
directors must also comply with applicable common law.43 And, 
common law fiduciary duties may constrain directors’ ability to 
change the date on which shareholders elect directors.44  
B.  Federal Elections 
U.S. citizens elect U.S. Senators, U.S. Representatives, and, 
indirectly, the U.S. President.45 The U.S. Constitution does not 
establish a specific date for federal elections.46 Instead, it 
empowers each state to establish a date for federal elections, but 
it also empowers Congress to preempt any such state decision 
 
 43. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 
2006) (requiring compliance with statutory and common law); Gilbert v. El 
Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1147 (Del. 1990) (same).  
 44. See infra Part 0. 
 45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall 
be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several 
States . . . .”); id. amend. XVII, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be 
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for 
six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.”); id. amend. XXIV, § 1  
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or 
other election for President or Vice President, for electors for 
President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in 
Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or 
any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. 
 46. See id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
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via federal legislation.47 Congress exercised this power to 
establish as federal election day the “Tuesday after the first 
Monday in November, in every even numbered year.”48 To 
change the date of federal elections, Congress need only amend 
the U.S. Code in accordance with constitutional requirements.49   
The Constitution, however, seemingly establishes explicit 
and implicit parameters within which Congress may delay or 
advance a federal election. As for delay, the Twentieth 
Amendment provides that “Congress shall assemble . . . at noon 
on the third day of January . . . .”50 By establishing a start date 
in early January, the amendment suggests that the election, 
because of which any new members of Congress will be seated, 
has already occurred. Even if that suggestion is accurate, the 
amendment continues: “The Congress shall assemble . . . at 
noon on the third day of January, unless they shall by law 
appoint a different day.”51 So, examining only the text, Congress 
could delay a federal election beyond the third of January, and 
also delay the beginning of its annual assemblage sometime 
beyond that delayed election. Nonetheless, the Constitution 
seemingly limits legislators’ ability to indefinitely delay an 
election. The Constitution contemplates an election every other 
year: “The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
Members chosen every second year by the people of the several 
states . . . .”52 By specifying an election “every second year,” it 
seems that the Congress could not delay an election until the 
“third” year, which contradicts the above-quoted language, and 
 
 47. See id. (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter 
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”); id. art. 
II, § 1, cl. 4 (“The Congress may determine the Time of chusing [sic] the 
Electors . . . .”).   
 48. 2 U.S.C. § 7 (addressing the election of members of the House); see id. 
§ 1 (addressing the election of Senators); 3 U.S.C. § 1 (“The electors of 
President and Vice President shall be appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday 
next after the first Monday in November, in every fourth year succeeding every 
election of a President and Vice President.”).  
 49. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.  
 50. Id. amend. XX, § 2. 
 51. Id. (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.   
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which would extend the terms of representatives and some 
senators beyond the terms specified in the Constitution.53 
Accepting such constraints, federal legislators still wield 
discretion to strategically time an election.54 
Regarding the advancement of a federal election, the “every 
second year” language of the Constitution also seemingly bars 
the acceleration of an election by one year.55 In terms of an 
implicit limit on the advancement of a federal election, one 
should be aware that the Constitution once provided for a 
lengthy lame duck period.56 Following ratification of the 
Constitution, the then-existing “Congress designated March 4, 
1789 as the official date when the Federal Government, as 
outlined in the Constitution, would begin 
operation . . . . [L]egislative and executive offices . . . would 
commence on March 4 and end in subsequent odd-numbered 
years on the same date.”57 Moreover, the Constitution once 
provided that Congress shall assemble annually in early 
December.58 Consequently, a Congressman newly elected in an 
even-numbered year, say November 1876,59 could not take office 
 
 53. See id. (specifying two-year term for representatives); id. art. I, § 3, 
cl. 1 (specifying six-year term for senators). 
 54. See 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 53 (1968) (quoting James Iredell, Convention of North Carolina, 
July 25, 1788) 
If Congress can prolong the election to any time they please, why is 
it said that representatives shall be chosen every second year? They 
must be chosen every second year; but whether in the month of 
March, or January, or any other month, may be ascertained, at a 
future time, by regulations of Congress. The word time refers only 
to the particular month and day within the two years. 
 55. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (specifying that an election should 
occur “every second year”). 
 56. See STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON THE CONST. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 99TH CONG., AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEF 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 59–60 (1985) [hereinafter AMENDMENTS].  
 57. Id. at 59; see Act to Change the Times for Holding Circuit and District 
Courts of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, ch. 11, § 3, 17 
Stat. 23, 28 (1872) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 7). 
 58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XX. 
 59. See § 3, 17 Stat. at 28 (“That the Tuesday next after the first Monday 
in November, in the year eighteen hundred and seventy-six, is hereby fixed 
 
Cleveland.Final .docx (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  4:45 PM 
1476 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1463 (2020) 
 
in December 1876, because the incumbent Congressman’s term 
did not expire until March 1877. Moreover, Congress did not sit 
between March 1877 and December 1877, so the term of the 
Congressman newly elected in November 1876 would not begin 
until early December 1877, after more than one year had passed 
from his election.60 Though not as lengthy, the presidential 
lame-duck period once ran four months—early November to 
early March.61 To shorten those lame-duck periods and for other 
reasons, Congress proposed, and the states ratified, the 
Twentieth Amendment.62 This background seemingly imposes 
an implicit limit on Congress’s ability to accelerate a federal 
election. To accelerate the date of a federal election to create a 
fourteen-month lame-duck period for members of Congress 
would seemingly contradict the intent of the Twentieth 
Amendment.63 It is not, however, immediately apparent why 
Congress could not accelerate the date of a federal election to 
lengthen the lame-duck for a period shorter than one year.64   
Perhaps members of Congress, like corporate directors, 
should be treated as fiduciaries, and perhaps common law 
should limit their ability to manipulate the election machinery 
in self-interested ways.65 
 
and established as the day, in each of the States and Territories of the United 
States, for the election of Representatives and Delegates to the Forty-Fifth 
Congress . . . .”). 
 60. See AMENDMENTS, supra note 56, at 59–60.  
 61. See Sam Barr, Shorten the Transition Period, HARV. POL. REV. (Nov. 
16, 2008), https://perma.cc/5XUX-XUD6.  
 62. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1. 
 63. Perhaps creating a five-month lame-duck period would be 
problematic, given the shortened lame-duck period for the president; however, 
it is not immediately apparent why the presidential election must occur on the 
same day as the election of members of Congress. See id. (providing different 
end dates for their terms).   
 64. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 65. See Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Political Theory 
and Legitimacy in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT 163, 164 (Evan J. Criddle et al. 
eds., 2018) (discussing fiduciary duties as a means of constraining political 
actors); Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 513, 573 (2015) (“[F]iduciary law provides sophisticated 
mechanisms to address agency problems that arise in legislative settings.”). 
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III. Fiduciaries 
While corporate democracy and political democracy may 
share some similarities,66 are there bases for courts to rely upon 
common law fiduciary principles applicable to directors under 
corporate law when resolving allegations against legislators? 
Yes. First, leading political and legal thinkers have recognized 
the historical connections between the governing principles of 
corporations, states, and the United States.67 Second, not every 
relationship gives rise to fiduciary obligations, so, when 
identifying those relationships that are fiduciary in nature, 
courts and legal scholars have crafted criteria that apply 
convincingly to federal politicians, as well as corporate 
directors, who have long been recognized as fiduciaries of the 
corporation and its shareholders.68 
A.  Historical Connections 
Justices of the Supreme Court, who were contemporaries of 
the Founders, referred to the United States as a corporation.69 
Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “The United States of America is 
the true name of that grand corporation which the American 
people have formed . . . .”70 Similarly, Founders recognized the 
United States as a corporation. Alexander Hamilton wrote, 
“[T]he institution of a government . . . [means] the creation of a 
body politic, or corporation of the highest nature . . . .”71 James 
Madison acknowledged that “[t]here was a gradation . . . from 
 
 66. See supra Part 0. 
 67. See infra Part 0. 
 68. See infra Part 0. 
 69. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 447 (1793) (“[N]ot only 
each State singly, but even the United States may without impropriety be 
termed ‘corporations.’”), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI. 
 70. Dixon v. United States, 7 F. Cas. 761, 763 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 
3,934). 
 71. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank 
of the United States, in THE FEDERALIST: COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1898). 
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the smallest corporation, with the most limited powers, to the 
largest empire with the most perfect sovereignty.”72 
As presented by William Blackstone, the towering English 
legal commentator, . . . and by James Wilson, a leading 
American legal commentator, leading participant in the 
Constitutional Convention, and future Supreme Court 
justice, a corporation is: A body politic created by the 
sovereign, exercising governmental authority delegated in 
special fashion by the sovereign, limited by the law of the 
sovereign, and structured by the sovereign. It is not so hard 
to imagine that the corporation . . . might become a model for 
a liberal constitutional republic.73 
Modern legal thinkers have also recognized the historical 
connection between corporations and the United States. Akhil 
Amar wrote of “U.S.A., Inc.,”74 analogizing government officials 
to corporate officials, in light of the fact that “the corporate 
analogy seeped deep into the thought patterns of the men who 
would eventually label themselves Federalists in 1787.”75 
According to David Ciepley, “all American governments 
qualified as literal corporations . . . .”76 And, writing specifically 
about the states, Ciepley emphasized that the “earliest 
American colonies, pioneers in the use of written constitutions, 
were pioneers because they were corporations—the Virginia 
Company, the Massachusetts Bay Company . . . [which] could, 
 
 72. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 463–64 
(Farrand, ed., 1911); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison) (ABA 
Classics ed., 2009) (discussing the power of the “constitutional charter”).  
 73. David Ciepley, Is the U.S. Government a Corporation? The Corporate 
Origins of Modern Constitutionalism, 111 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 418, 420–21 
(2017); see TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 113 (2011) (“[F]iduciaries hold 
positions of power, such as . . . government offices . . . .”); id. at 279–87 
(discussing government officials as fiduciaries). 
 74. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 
1425, 1517 (1987). 
 75. Id. at 1434; see Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public 
Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1084–86 (2004) (reporting that both proponents 
and opponents of the U.S. Constitution used fiduciary language—“public 
trust,” “trustees,” “entrusted,” and “agent”). 
 76. Ciepley, supra note 73, at 433. 
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without changing a word, repurpose [its] company charter as a 
colonial constitution.”77 
Moreover, legal scholars have referenced the corporate 
analogy when addressing obligations of legislators in the voting 
context.78 This Article builds upon the foundational 
legislator-as-fiduciary work of Evan J. Criddle, Evan 
Fox-Decent, Tamar Frankel, Andrew S. Gold, Sung Hui Kim, 
Ethan J. Leib, Paul B. Miller, Robert G. Natelson, and David L. 
Ponet,79 while acknowledging the limitations that they specify 
in their own work, as well as criticisms identified by Seth Davis, 
Heather K. Gerken, and Michael S. Kang.80 
B.  Characteristics of Fiduciaries 
Courts have long identified certain relationships as 
fiduciary in nature: trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, and 
attorney-client.81 Courts, however, have been “extremely vague 
 
 77. Id. at 423–24. 
 78. See Rave, supra note 24, at 676–77; Kim, supra note 25, at 871 tbl.1. 
 79. See FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 286 (“The different views concerning 
the fiduciary laws, both private and governmental, relate to where the lines 
should be drawn rather than to the principles to be followed.”); Evan J. Criddle 
& Evan Fox-Decent, Guardians of Legal Order: The Dual Commission of 
Public Fiduciaries, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT 67, 83 (2018) (“[A]ll public 
institutions—including the various organs of the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches—stand in fiduciary relationships to the people over whom 
they assert jurisdiction . . . .”); Kim, supra note 25, at 870 (discussing 
“Legislators as Fiduciaries”); Miller & Gold, supra note 65, at 565 (“The idea 
that the state and its officials occupy a fiduciary role is longstanding . . . .”); 
Natelson, supra note 75, at 1095–136 (detailing the legal and philosophical 
influences of the Founders, including Plato and Blackstone, that contemplated 
fiduciary government); David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s 
Lessons for Deliberative Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (2011) 
(“[T]hinking of public officials as fiduciaries is not only an historical 
inheritance but is also indicated by functional and structural considerations 
of the relationship between the ruler and ruled.”). 
 80. See infra Part 0 (addressing criticisms set forth in Seth Davis, The 
False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 N.D. L. REV. 1145 (2014); Heather 
K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, Deja Vu All Over Again: Courts, Corporate Law, 
and Election Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 86 (2013)). 
 81. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 220–21 (2003) 
(referring to attorneys as fiduciaries of clients); Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath 
Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 11 (2001) (referring to trustees as 
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in articulating the standards”82 to determine whether a 
relationship is fiduciary in nature.83 Scholars have surveyed 
cases to identify those standards. Though, in certain respects, 
each scholar’s theory differs, they have identified some common 
ground.84 
 
fiduciaries of beneficiaries); Yerger v. Jones, 57 U.S. 30, 33 (1854) (referring 
to guardians as fiduciaries of wards); see also D. Gordon Smith, The Critical 
Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1412–13 (2002) 
(referring to relations identified as fiduciary in nature for centuries). 
 82. Smith, supra note 81, at 1412.  
 83. See id. at 1448–49 (“Fiduciary and nonfiduciary relationships do not 
occupy wholly separate realms, but instead lie on a continuum. Passage from 
one side of the continuum to the other is seamless; nevertheless, courts are 
tasked with locating a seam.”). 
 84. See EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS 
FIDUCIARY 93–94 (2011) 
The fundamental conditions which give rise to a fiduciary 
relationship are the following:  (i) the fiduciary has administrative 
control over the beneficiary or certain of her interests; (ii) the 
beneficiary is incapable of controlling the fiduciary’s exercise of 
power, or is incapable in principle of exercising the kind of power 
held by the fiduciary; and (iii) the relevant interests of the 
beneficiary are capable of forming the subject matter of a fiduciary 
obligation. 
See also Miller & Gold, supra note 65, at 549 (“A fiduciary relationship is one 
in which one person (the fiduciary) enjoys discretionary power to pursue an 
abstract other-regarding purpose or the significant practical interests of 
another person (an individual beneficiary or ascertained set of 
beneficiaries).”); Ponet & Leib, supra note 79, at 1255 
In the fiduciary relationship, the beneficiary is dependent on the 
fiduciary to act after her interests and the fiduciary is, accordingly, 
obligated to use her entrusted discretionary power in pursuit of the 
beneficiary’s interests. Because they are difficult to monitor, and 
have wide access to power over beneficiary resources and assets, 
fiduciaries are under rigorous obligations that ensure compliance 
with their role responsibilities. (footnotes omitted)  
Smith, supra note 81, at 1402 (“[F]iduciary relationships form when one party 
(the ‘fiduciary’) acts on behalf of another party (the ‘beneficiary’) while 
exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the 
beneficiary.”); cf. Kim, supra note 25, at 867–68 (“Instead of deploying a widely 
accepted, precise, and rule-like definition . . . courts . . . invoke an ad hoc list 
of vague factors” to identify fiduciaries, including an “imbalance in the 
relationship,” “dominance,” or “granting of some form of discretionary 
authority and a resulting dependency.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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Tamar Frankel proposes that all fiduciaries share the 
following characteristics: 
First, fiduciaries offer mainly services (in contrast to 
products). The services that fiduciaries offer are usually 
socially desirable, and often require expertise . . . . Second, 
in order to perform these services effectively, fiduciaries 
must be entrusted with property or power. Third, 
entrustment poses to entrustors the risks that the fiduciaries 
will not be trustworthy. They may . . . misuse the entrusted 
power . . . . Fourth, there is likelihood that (1) the entrustor 
will fail to protect itself from the risks involved in fiduciary 
relationships; (2) the markets may fail to protect entrustors 
from these risks; and that (3) the costs for the fiduciaries of 
establishing their trustworthiness may be higher than their 
benefits from the relationships.85 
Evan Fox-Decent, Andrew S. Gold, Ethan J. Leib, Paul B. 
Miller, David L. Ponet, and D. Gordon Smith largely agree with 
the characteristics identified by Frankel.86 Corporate 
directors—long recognized as fiduciaries of the corporation and 
shareholders—reflect those characteristics, as do federal 
legislators.87 
1.  Service 
Fiduciaries typically provide socially-desirable services, not 
products, that commonly require expertise.88 For example, the 
law has long recognized as fiduciaries doctors and lawyers, who 
provide socially-desirable services that require expertise.89 
While plumbers provide socially-desirable services that require 
expertise, the law generally does not recognize plumbers as 
fiduciaries because they do not adequately meet other criteria 
outlined in this section.90 For example, the degree of trust is 
 
 85. FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 6 (citations omitted). 
 86. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 87. FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 22–23, 113 (“[F]iduciaries hold positions 
of power, such as . . . government offices . . . .”); id. at 279–87 (discussing 
government officials as fiduciaries). 
 88. See id. at 6. 
 89. See id. at 42–43. 
 90. See id. at 7.  
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likely lower with respect to a plumber than a doctor—yes, you 
trust a plumber to unclog the drain, but you place much more 
trust in a doctor to unclog your artery.91 Moreover, the entrustor 
is better able to monitor a plumber (“Is my sink unclogged or 
not?”) relative to monitoring a doctor (“Is my artery unclogged 
or not?”).92 
a.  Directors 
Corporate directors provide services that are 
socially-desirable and require expertise. As a general matter, 
every state views corporations as socially beneficial: Every state 
provides for their creation, views directors as providing socially 
beneficial services, and contemplates that directors will manage 
those corporations.93 Directors possess pertinent expertise that 
contributes to their election or appointment.94 Corporate 
directors have long been recognized as fiduciaries.95   
b.  Legislators 
Legislators provide services that are socially-desirable and 
require expertise. “Public offices are . . . delegations of portions 
of the sovereign power for the welfare of the public . . . .”96 
 
 91. See id. at 12. 
 92. See infra Part 0. 
 93. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102, 141 (West 2020). 
 94. See Steve Wolosky et al., Top 5 Things Shareholder Activists Need to 
Know, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. (Dec. 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/9YVK-
QARW (“An activist’s likelihood of success in an election contest is inextricably 
tied to the qualifications and expertise of the activist’s director slate.”); see also 
Robin Ferracone, Good Governance:  Do Boards Need Cyber Security Experts?, 
FORBES (July 9, 2019, 12:42 PM), https://perma.cc/TMU7-TZAY (“It is 
increasingly accepted that it is important to have a cybersecurity/technology 
expert on a given company’s board to ensure the board is aware of potential 
business risks.”). 
 95. FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 42, 50 (noting that “traditional fiduciaries” 
include corporate directors). 
 96. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 1 (2020); see id. § 3 
(“A public office is created in the interest and for the benefit of the 
people . . . .”); FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 23 (“[A]n entrustment of the power 
of office . . . must be used for the benefit of the population . . . .”).   
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Members of Congress do not produce products per se;97 they 
serve their constituents.98 Members of Congress serve their 
constituents by enacting legislation,99 monitoring the executive 
branch,100 and convening hearings and conducting 
investigations regarding public101 and private 
parties102— perhaps as a prelude to congressional action. 
Members of the House serve their districts, their states, and the 
United States;103 senators serve their states and the United 
States.104 While certain fiduciaries, like doctors and lawyers, 
must pass written exams to demonstrate their expertise,105 the 
U.S. Constitution imposes minimal qualifications for service as 
a senator or representative.106 Nonetheless, those who campaign 
 
 97. However, some do consider legislation to be a product. See Roberta 
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 225, 280–81 (1985). 
 98. See generally R.J. DUKE SHORT, THE CENTENNIAL SENATOR 31 (2006) 
(“Senator Thurmond’s constituent service was legendary. . . . [He] called it 
‘doing the people’s work’.”). 
 99. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 7–8. 
 100. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 865, 889 (2007). 
 101. See, e.g., Lisa Friedman, The Investigations That Led to Scott Pruitt’s 
Resignation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/W9WK-YHQ5. 
 102. See, e.g., Mark Zuckerberg Testimony: Senators Question Facebook’s 
Commitment to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/EZY3-
D6LU. 
 103. See Kim, supra note 25, at 870–71 (“Consider the following potential 
beneficiaries [of legislators]: citizens, the legislature (and fellow legislators), 
and the government that the legislator serves.”). 
 104. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 62, 63 (James Madison). 
 105. See Emma Goldberg, Bar and Medical Exam Delays Keep Graduates 
in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/T7BY-8VEV (reporting 
that COVID-19 prevented the administration of professionally required 
exams). 
 106. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative 
who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven 
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an 
Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No 
Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty 
Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, 
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.”). 
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for federal office tout their qualifications, as well as their areas 
of pertinent expertise.107 
2.  Entrustment Regarding Power or Property 
To perform the services mentioned above, a fiduciary must 
be entrusted with discretion regarding power or property.108 
Absent such entrustment, the entrusting party does not derive 
the benefit of the relationship.109 For example, a principal 
entrusts an agent—a long-recognized fiduciary—with the power 
to legally bind the principal.110 Patients entrust their 
health— power over their well-being—to their fiduciary 
doctors.111 Clients may entrust their liberty—power over their 
well-being—to their fiduciary lawyers.112 A trustor entrusts 
property to a trustee.113  
 
 107. See generally Meet Elizabeth, WARREN FOR PRESIDENT, https://
perma.cc/W3EK-QLLU (touting her expertise in bankruptcy and consumer 
finance as qualifications to benefit the middle class and to provide a check on 
corporate power). 
 108. See FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 6 (“[F]iduciaries must be entrusted 
with property or power.”); FOX-DECENT, supra note 84, at 93–94 (referencing 
the necessary condition of “administrative power over the beneficiary or 
certain of her interests”); Ponet & Leib, supra note 79, at 1255 (referencing 
“entrusted discretionary power in pursuit of the beneficiary’s interests” and 
“wide access to power over beneficiary resources and assets”); Smith, supra 
note 81, at 1443 (“[A] critical resource . . . is the basis for imposition of 
fiduciary duties . . . .”). 
 109. See FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 8 (“Entrustors entrust property of 
power to fiduciaries . . . for the purpose of benefiting the entrustors . . . .”).  
 110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006) 
(“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a 
‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall 
act on the principal’s behalf . . . and the agent manifests assent or otherwise 
consents so to act.”). 
 111. See FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 43 (addressing the doctor-patient 
relationship). 
 112. See, e.g., La. State Bar Ass’n v. Amberg, 553 So. 2d 448, 450 (La. 1989) 
(listing the “cherished right[s]” clients entrust to their lawyers: life, liberty, 
and property). 
 113. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. L. INST. 2003)  
A trust . . . is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, 
arising from a manifestation of intention to create that relationship 
and subjecting the person who holds title to the property to duties 
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a.  Directors 
As a legal-fiction entity, a corporation cannot manage itself, 
so the law entrusts its management to a board of directors,114 
each of whom must be a natural person.115 As corporations 
increase in size, they typically exhibit a separation of ownership 
and control—with shareholders “owning” the corporation, and 
directors and officers “controlling” the corporation.116 Corporate 
shareholders, who elect directors,117 place their trust in 
directors to manage the corporation for their benefit.118   
b.  Legislators 
The Constitution contemplates a representative 
government,119 not direct democracy of the sort practiced in New 
England town hall meetings.120 Thus, the electorate does not 
govern itself; instead, the populace elects others to govern on 
their behalf. The Constitution grants tremendous discretion to 
 
to deal with it for the benefit of charity or for one or more persons, 
at least one of whom is not the sole trustee. 
 114. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2020) (“The business 
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed 
by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”). 
 115. See, e.g., id. § 141(b) (“The board of directors of a corporation shall 
consist of 1 or more members, each of whom shall be a natural person.”). 
 116. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6–7 (1933). Rather than “owners,” 
shareholders might more accurately be described as “residual claimants.” 
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 67–68 (1991). 
 117. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3).  
 118. See Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 206 (Del. 2008) (noting that 
directors owe duties to the corporation and its shareholders); In re Trados Inc. 
S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (reporting that 
director-fiduciaries must “maximize the value of the corporation over the 
long-term” for the benefit of shareholders). 
 119. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 49 (James Madison) (ABA Classics ed., 
2009). 
 120. Cf. Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Ind. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 
793–94 (2015) (highlighting the novelty of “direct lawmaking by the people” in 
1787); FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 23 (highlighting the “entrustment of the 
power of office”).  
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members of Congress over the electorate.121 The Constitution 
empowers members of Congress to impact the electorate by 
taxing them,122 enacting laws that could result in their 
incarceration,123 and subjecting them to war and military 
service.124 “[A] public office is considered a public trust.”125 
3.  Risk of Untrustworthiness or Abuse of Power 
Having been entrusted with power or property, the 
fiduciary possesses discretion to perform the service or oversee 
the entrusted property, and that discretion may be abused.126 
Untrustworthiness arises because the entrusting party cannot 
foresee, and contract for, all eventualities.127 Of course, any 
contractual relationship gives rise to issues of trust, which could 
be exploited, but not every contractual relationship gives rise to 
a fiduciary relationship.128 Courts and commentators seek, 
perhaps as mentioned above, the entrustment of more 
significant powers or larger amounts of property.129 And, as 
mentioned below, a fiduciary relationship arises where the 
exercise of discretion by the entrusted party cannot be easily 
and effectively monitored by the entrusting party.130 For 
example, a lawyer-fiduciary may draft a flawed will, which flaws 
 
 121. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (establishing Congress’s legislative powers). 
 122. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 123. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 6, 10, 18. 
 124. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–16. 
 125. State ex rel. Bonner v. Dist. Ct., 206 P.2d 166, 169 (Mont. 1949). 
 126. See FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 6 (discussing the risk of untrustworthy 
fiduciaries); FOX-DECENT, supra note 84, at 93 (“[T]he beneficiary is incapable 
of controlling the fiduciary’s exercise of power . . . .”); Kim, supra note 25, at 
867–68 (citing courts’ references to “discretionary authority,” “imbalance in 
the relationship,” and “dominance”).  
 127. Smith, supra note 81, at 1448 (“[C]ontracts . . . specifying obligations 
of the fiduciary are necessarily incomplete . . . .”). 
 128. See FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 12 (“[T]he necessary degree of trust in 
fiduciary relationship[s] must be quite high.”); Smith, supra note 81, at 
1438– 39 (distinguishing fiduciary relationships from other contractual 
relationships). 
 129. See FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 26 (“Depending on the nature of the 
services, greater specifications, constraints, or control over the fiduciaries’ 
performance would undermine the very utility of the relationship.”).   
 130. See infra Part III.B.4. 
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may not be identified ex ante by the non-lawyer testator or 
non-lawyer beneficiaries, and which flaws may be identified 
only after the testator’s death. 
a.  Directors 
In managing a corporation, directors enjoy tremendous 
discretion. Under the business judgment rule, when 
shareholders challenge decisions by the board of directors, 
courts defer to those decisions, except in limited 
circumstances.131 Such discretion may enable untrustworthy 
decisions or may result in an abuse of power.132 Contracts 
cannot effectively bind directors: How could the parties know, 
on day one, how a director should vote on a proposed merger or 
charter amendment that may not arise until day 200, except in 
 
 131. See Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22 n.37 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting 
that plaintiff-shareholders must overcome the presumptions of the business 
judgment rule, such as the presumptions that directors were informed and 
acted in good faith to further the best interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders, not to further their self-interest).  
 132. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 
(Del. 1989)  
The board was torpid, if not supine, in its efforts to establish a truly 
independent auction, free of [one bidder’s] interference and access 
to confidential data. By placing the entire process in the hands of 
[the chief executive officer, who was also a bidder in the auction], 
through his own chosen financial advisors, with little or no board 
oversight, the board materially contributed to the unprincipled 
conduct of those upon whom it looked with a blind eye. 
Steven J. Cleveland, A Failure of Substance and a Failure of Process: The 
Circular Odyssey of Oklahoma’s Corporate Law Amendments in 2010, 2012, 
and 2013, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 221, 227–28 (2015)  
[A]s its stock price plummeted in 2008, Chesapeake’s board agreed 
to purchase from its CEO a number of antique maps for $12 million. 
The board’s generosity seemed tied to the personal needs of its CEO, 
not to the company’s performance. To cover a margin call, 
McClendon involuntarily sold 30,000,000 shares of Chesapeake—or 
approximately 94% of the shares he owned—over the course of three 
days in October 2008. Following those sales, the board responded, 
but not as the market might have expected; the board amended 
McClendon’s employment agreement to reduce his required 
investment in Chesapeake, which weakened the link between his 
personal interests and the interests of Chesapeake’s shareholders. 
(footnotes omitted). 
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abstract terms—e.g., maximize shareholder value—which 
terms do not lend themselves to enforceable contracts, but do 
lend themselves to contextual fiduciary duties?   
b.  Legislators 
Sadly, federal politicians, all too frequently, have proven 
untrustworthy and have abused their power. Sometimes, such 
incidents so captured our attention that they become known by 
short-hand: McCarthyism,133 Watergate,134 and the Teapot 
Dome Scandal.135 Senators and representatives have used their 
positions for sexual benefit,136 conversions of contributions for 
personal use,137 and insider trading.138 Politicians may make 
unenforceable pledges, but contracts cannot effectively 
discipline politicians.139 As a preliminary matter, with whom 
 
 133. See generally DAVID M. OSHINSKY, A CONSPIRACY SO IMMENSE:  THE 
WORLD OF JOE MCCARTHY (1983). 
 134. See generally CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE 
PRESIDENT’S MEN (1974). 
 135. See generally LATON MCCARTNEY, THE TEAPOT DOME SCANDAL: HOW 
BIG OIL BOUGHT THE HARDING WHITE HOUSE AND TRIED TO STEAL THE COUNTRY 
(2008). 
 136. See Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Rep. Raul Grijalva Under Scrutiny by 
House Ethics Committee over Workplace Allegations, ARIZ. CENT. (JUNE 14, 
2019, 4:42 PM), https://perma.cc/8733-LLYR (reporting allegations that 
member was repeatedly drunk and created hostile work environment); 90 
State Lawmakers Accused of Sexual Misconduct Since 2017, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Feb. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/H2PT-2GJS (reporting instances of lawmaker 
sexual misconduct, including abusing staffers and constituents); 
Congressional Misconduct Database, GOVTRACK, https://perma.cc/VU4V-
GFMT (reporting allegations of sexual misconduct). 
 137. See Congressional Misconduct Database, supra note 136 (reporting 
misuse of campaign funds, and bribery). 
 138. See Kim, supra note 25, at 846–47 (referencing Representative 
Spencer Bachus’s alleged insider trading during the 2008 financial crisis). 
 139. Compare Ari Shapiro, The Man Behind the GOP’s No-Tax Pledge, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 14, 2011, 4:30 PM), https://perma.cc/42WG-NB6A 
(quoting Grover Norquist) (“Take the pledge, win the primary. Take the 
pledge, win the general. Break the pledge, lose.”), with U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 
(requiring members of Congress to take oath to support the Constitution), id. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (empowering Congress to impose taxes), and John Dean, Why 
Grover Norquist’s Anti-Tax Pledge is Unenforceable and Unconstitutional, 
VERDICT (Nov. 30, 2012), https://perma.cc/S5ZA-KNRV (“There is no 
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would a politician enter an enforceable contract? And, as was 
the case with corporate directors, the parties to the contract 
would be unable to foresee issues that would arise or how those 
future issues should be resolved ex ante, except in abstract 
terms that do not lend themselves to enforceable contracts, e.g., 
“When faced with a tax bill, the politician shall vote to further 
the public interest.”140   
4.  Monitoring Costs, Bonding Costs, and Market Discipline 
Courts are less inclined to recognize fiduciary relationships 
where monitoring costs or bonding costs are low or where the 
market adequately disciplines the supposed fiduciary. As a 
simple analogy to introduce these concepts, consider the 
parent-babysitter relationship. A parent, who goes to the movies 
for date night, and who entrusts a child to a babysitter, bears 
monitoring costs by, for example, purchasing a nanny-cam to 
ensure that the babysitter is performing the job as desired. A 
babysitter bears bonding costs to align his interests with the 
parent’s interests. For example, a babysitter may regularly 
charge a standard rate, say $10.00 per hour, but, to bond his 
interests to those of the parent, the babysitter agrees to a lower 
hourly rate if (i) the child fails to eat a serving of spinach at 
dinner, (ii) the child fails to complete assigned homework, or (iii) 
the child fails to brush her teeth before bedtime. Chatter among 
parents in the neighborhood—an information market—may also 
discipline babysitters who seek additional work. The 
availability of other local babysitters—a labor 
market— similarly incents compliance with parents’ 
preferences. 
 
consideration, as would be required for the Norquist pledge to be binding. 
Rather, the pledge is merely a written campaign promise.”). 
 140. See Dean, supra note 139 (noting that compliance with the oath to 
uphold the Constitution requires an exercise of discretion, not compliance with 
pre-election pledge); Alex Altman, The Perils of Political Pledges, TIME (July 
1, 2011), https://perma.cc/VK4F-WFUC (exploring the limits of political 
pledges). 
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a.  Monitoring Costs 
Courts and commentators recognize fiduciary relationships 
where the entrusting party cannot effectively monitor the 
entrusted party.141 The following must be relatively cost 
effective: (1) the accumulation of relevant information, (2) the 
review and comprehension of that information, and (3) the 
ability to act on that information in ways that discipline the 
straying fiduciary.142 For example, in the doctor-patient 
fiduciary relationship, the patient may relatively cheaply gather 
information—consultations pre-treatment and acquisition of 
medical charts post-treatment. However, the expertise of the 
doctor fiduciary renders monitoring difficult for patients who 
lack that expertise.143 Relatedly, simply examining the results 
of the treatment provides a poor proxy for the doctor’s 
performance of her duties. Was the patient’s death or worsening 
condition due to the doctor’s failure or the patient’s poor 
condition at the time that treatment was sought? 
(1)  Directors 
Monitoring costs commonly inhibit shareholders from 
disciplining corporate directors. Federal and state law require 
directors to disclose information to keep shareholders informed 
generally and in connection with matters subject to a vote by 
shareholders.144 However, directors are not obligated to provide 
information to shareholders simply because that information is 
 
 141. See Ponet & Leib, supra note 79, at 1255 (stating  that fiduciaries are 
“difficult to monitor”); Smith, supra note 81, at 1443 (“Where self-help 
protection of the critical resource is strong, the case for judicial protection 
through the imposition of loyalty obligations is weak . . . .”). 
 142. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 116, at 9–10, 46, 91–92. 
 143. The beneficiary’s possession of expertise does not foil a fiduciary 
relationship. For example, attorneys are advised not to represent themselves, 
so an attorney-client benefits from a fiduciary relationship with the retained 
attorney-fiduciary. 
 144. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (requiring that publicly-traded corporations file 
publicly-available, periodic reports); id. § 78n (requiring that publicly-traded 
corporations provide shareholders with information regarding upcoming 
votes); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (West 2020) (requiring that corporations 
provide information to shareholders regarding votes on mergers). 
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desired or would be useful.145 The significant amount of 
information disclosed may never be read or may not be 
understood by many shareholders.146 Notwithstanding 
significant disclosure, investors may not comprehend the 
information available.147 
Third parties may also be retained to provide monitoring 
services. For example, directors may subject their performance 
to verification by independent auditors.148 Independent auditors 
review the corporation’s financial statements to verify that 
those statements conform to generally accepted accounting 
principles.149 Nonetheless, such third-party monitoring may 
prove ineffective.150 The financial statements of Enron and 
WorldCom were audited by independent third parties, which did 
not prevent those companies from engaging in accounting 
shenanigans.151 While third party-verifiers as a whole have 
strong incentives to protect their reputations,152 individuals at 
 
 145. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (“Silence, 
absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading . . . .”); Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, 
Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. 2000) (acknowledging that “[p]rojections, more 
current financials and information about prices discussed with other possible 
acquirors” may be helpful, but information need not be disclosed “simply 
because [it] might be helpful”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Rethinking the Board 
of Directors: Getting Outside the Box, 74 BUS. LAW. 285, 294 (2019) (“Once 
directors are on the board, they are largely insulated from market forces, 
because votes are private and decisions are made collectively.”). 
 146. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 116, at 297 (noting that 
unsophisticated investors are uninformed). 
 147. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 270–74 
(2014) (discussing criticisms of the efficient capital markets hypothesis); id. at 
289–91 (Thomas, J., concurring) (same). 
 148. See Financial Reporting Manual, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 2, 
2019), https://perma.cc/73TU-QKVE (noting that for certain companies, 
“[f]inancial statements . . . must be reviewed by an independent accountant 
before filing”). 
 149. See id.  
 150. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698–702 
(2005) (discussing third-party monitoring gone awry). 
 151. See id. at 698–702 (2005) (detailing Enron’s dubious accounting 
practices); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 397–98 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (detailing WorldCom’s dubious accounting practices). 
 152. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 116, at 282. 
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those firms may face incentive structures that lead them to 
provide false certifications.153   
The securities markets provide a means of disciplining 
directors, but less so if information is not disclosed or is 
misunderstood and as impediments to acquisitions and activism 
increase.154 Shareholders vote, but infrequently,155 lessening the 
effect of one avenue of discipline on straying directors.156 
Despite the shareholders’ collective power to elect and remove 
directors,157 directors rarely face competitive elections, and are 
rarely removed from office in the middle of their terms.158 
Collective action problems counsel against meaningful 
participation in the electoral process by holders of a small 
number of shares.159 Holders of a large number of shares may 
abide by the “Wall Street Rule,” selling their shares rather than 
trying to halt an unwise decision or generally trying to improve 
the governance of a particular corporation.160 In the end, 
directors may not be disciplined except in extremis. 161   
 
 153. See Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A 
Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 184 
(2000). 
 154. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 56–57 (Del. 
Ch. 2011) (expressing doubt that an inadequate offer constitutes a threat 
against which directors should be able to defend but adhering to binding 
precedent and upholding the continued maintenance of a poison pill). 
 155. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 116, at 66 (“Because voting 
is expensive, the participants in the venture will arrange to conserve on its 
use.”). 
 156. See id.  
 157. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(k), 216 (West 2020). 
 158. See STEVEN J. CLEVELAND, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS: A MULTIMEDIA APPROACH loc. 11493 (3d ed. 2018) (ebook) 
(discussing the infrequency of “proxy contests”); Bainbridge, supra note 145, 
at 294 (“Today, there is no true market in which prospective directors compete 
for positions.” (footnote omitted)); Kelli Alces Williams, Externalizing Board 
Governance Means Changing the Board’s Function, 74 BUS. LAW. 297, 298 
(2019) (discussing CEOs calling on friends and acquaintances to fill director 
vacancies). 
 159. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 116, at 71. 
 160. George W. Dent, Jr., A Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 1287, 1288–89. 
 161. See Bainbridge, supra note 145, at 286 (“[T]oday there is a general 
consensus that boards, as currently structured, fail all too frequently.”). 
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(2)  Legislators 
Voters may not be able to effectively discipline politicians 
due to monitoring costs and the voters’ relative inability to act 
on available information. C-SPAN, Congress.gov, and other 
sources provide an abundance of information regarding 
members of Congress and congressional (in)action.162 However, 
C-SPAN is not a ratings killer,163 and, while Congress.gov had 
over one million page views one day in January 2017,164 consider 
that ESPN.com—a website dedicated to sports—had over ten 
million page views per day throughout August 2019.165  Instead 
of relying upon firehose sources of information, like C-SPAN or 
Congress.gov, voters may turn to third parties—e.g., the New 
York Times or Fox News—to distill an avalanche of information 
into digestible morsels.166 Still, valuable information—e.g., a 
Congress member’s ability to effectively negotiate behind the 
scenes—may not be available to the voting public.167 
Scholars commonly claim that voters are rationally 
ignorant.168 This theory speaks to voters’ incentives to 
 
 162. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (requiring that each house of 
Congress maintain a publicly-available journal that details proceedings and 
votes). 
 163. Cf. Nicole Hemmer, An Ode to C-SPAN in an Era Dominated by Cable 
TV like Fox News, NBC (Mar. 27, 2019, 10:35 AM), https://perma.cc/LFS2-
UEQF (“[T]here are no ratings figures for C-SPAN to determine if it attracts 
more eyeballs than, say, MSNBC. (We can assume it does not.)”). 
 164. Reaching a Web Traffic Milestone on Congress.gov, LIBR. OF CONG. 
(Apr. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/99CC-UKSW. 
 165. See ESPN.com Continues to Reign Among Sports Sites; Site Continues 
to Show Year-Over-Year Growth, ESPN (Sept. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc
/AY9C-VXR5. 
 166. See Hemmer, supra note 163 (“These days the American political 
scene is much more a product of Fox News and CNN than C-SPAN . . . .”).  
 167. See Sarah A. Binder & Frances E. Lee, Making Deals in Congress, in 
POLITICAL NEGOTIATION: A HANDBOOK 64 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo 
Martin eds., 2016) (noting that members of Congress conduct 
“negotiations . . . behind closed doors”). 
 168. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Decentralization, and Development, 
102 MINN. L. REV. 1649, 1657 (2018) (discussing voters’ incentives to be 
“rationally ignorant”).  
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accumulate and comprehend information,169 as well as a voter’s 
limited ability to discipline any politician that deviates from a 
voter’s preferred course of action.170 Voters cannot remove any 
federal politician from office during the middle of her term; the 
powers of impeachment and removal are reserved to the House 
and the Senate through independent processes.171 This 
structure lessens accountability to voters. Moreover, federal 
politicians serve multi-year terms, so there are infrequent 
opportunities for voters to oust underperforming officials from 
office.172 Without an effective challenger, political incumbents 
face less accountability. Federal elections are generally 
contested, but competitive campaigns can be extraordinarily 
expensive.173 Incumbents enjoy numerous advantages over 
challengers, including a fundraising advantage.174 A majority of 
incumbent legislators routinely retain their seats.175 Of course, 
 
 169. See id. (“In addition to acquiring very little information, voters have 
little incentive to analyze what they do learn in a logical, unbiased way.”). 
 170. See id. at 1658 (recognizing the dearth of “clout tha[t] an average 
ballot-box voter [has] in an election”).  
 171. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; see Ciepley, supra note 
73, at 432 (noting that Antifederalists failed in their quest to empower the 
populace to recall federal politicians in the middle of their terms). 
 172. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (setting senators’ terms of office at six 
years); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (setting representatives’ terms of office at two years); 
id. art II, § 1, cl. 1 (setting the President’s term of office at four years). 
 173. See Statistical Summary of 18-Month Campaign Activity of the 
2017– 2018 Election Cycle, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (Aug. 30, 2018), https://
perma.cc/92SX-AMSD (“Congressional candidates running in 2017 and 2018 
collected $1.7 billion and disbursed $1.1 billion, political parties received 
$924.3 million and spent $690.9 million, and political action committees 
(PACs) raised $2.6 billion and spent $2.2 billion during the first 18 months of 
the 2017-2018 election cycle . . . .”).  
 174. Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to 
Textualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2411 (2006) (reviewing 
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2005)) (stating that campaign finance laws “mak[e] it more 
difficult for challengers to raise sufficient funds to overcome the advantages of 
incumbency”). 
 175. See Paul Bedard, 2020 Swamp: 79 Percent of House Seats Already 
Rated “Safe”, WASH. EXAM’R (Jan. 17, 2019, 2:42 PM), https://perma.cc/Y9NL-
6SEX (“The first analysis of the upcoming 2020 congressional election shows 
that already nearly 8 in 10 members are in ‘safe’ districts . . . .”); Stuart 
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a single voter is unlikely to impact the outcome of a public 
election.176 Collective action problems contribute to federal 
politicians’ lack of accountability.177 The high cost of educating 
oneself about competing candidates and their positions, and the 
low likelihood of one’s vote altering the outcome of the election 
lead to rational ignorance and rational apathy.178 While there 
exists a competitive market at the time of the election of a 
federal politician, and at the time of re-election, the market 
provides no competition during her term, that is, between 
elections.179 This amounts to an important disparity with 
respect to corporate directors, at least directors of corporations 
with publicly-traded stock, who face discipline via the stock 
market between the times of their election.180 
Even if there is no opposing political candidate to provide 
accountability, an incumbent may be held accountable by the 
people, an opposing political party, opposing interest groups, or 
the press.181 This is not to say that, with limited accountability, 
every politician will run amok because honor will lead most 
politicians to serve with distinction.182 
 
Rotenberg, The 8 Senate Races Likely to Determine Control of the Senate, ROLL 
CALL (June 4, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://perma.cc/7EML-6QGS (“[A]lmost 
two-thirds of Senate contests this cycle start as ‘safe’ for the incumbent party 
and are likely to remain that way.”). 
 176. See Somin, supra note 168, at 1655 (“[I]ndividual voters have almost 
no chance of actually affecting the outcome of most elections . . . .”). 
 177. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 126 (referencing the “aggregate 
of unorganized individuals—society”). 
 178. See Somin, supra note 168, at 1657 (“[I]ndividual voters . . . usually 
have little or no incentive to make an informed choice.”). 
 179. But see Rave, supra note 24, at 694 (“Elections can help select agents 
who are likely to have similar interests as principals and provide incentives 
for agents to act faithfully to increase their chances of reelection.”). 
 180. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 116, at 5 (“The firms and 
managers that make the choices investors prefer will prosper relative to 
others.”). 
 181. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 73, at xiii (“In America, among social 
pressures is public opinion, expressed in newspapers, television and mass 
interaction by electronic devices.”). 
 182. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (requiring that members of Congress vow to 
support and defend the U.S. Constitution and to faithfully discharge the duties 
of office). 
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b.  Bonding Costs 
A fiduciary may bond her interests to the interests of the 
beneficiary.183 For example, an attorney-fiduciary may 
represent a client on a contingency fee basis. In theory, the 
attorney-fiduciary bonds her interest to the interests of her 
client; as the amount available to the client increases, the 
attorney’s fee increases.184 
(1)  Directors 
Directors may bear bonding costs to align their interests 
with the interests of shareholders. Directors, who pay 
themselves, may structure their compensation to align their 
interests with the interests of shareholders.185 Because 
shareholders would like the stock price to increase, directors 
may compensate themselves with stock options,186 which 
increase in value as the stock price increases.187 
Bonding costs may prove ineffective. Stock options may be 
poorly-crafted, such that directors benefit in situations where 
shareholders are disappointed by the directors’ performance.188 
For example, a corporation may have been outperformed 
significantly by every member of its peer group, such that the 
shareholders of that corporation are disappointed in the 
directors. However, if the overall stock market is performing 
well, then the stock price of that corporation may have 
increased, such that any stock options have over-compensated 
 
 183. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 116, at 10.   
 184. Cf. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE 
ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 7–9 (2009) (discussing 
the difficulty of crafting effective incentive compensation for agents in the real 
estate market). 
 185. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(h) (West 2020). 
 186. See id. § 157. 
 187. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 57 (Del. 2006) 
(en banc).  
 188. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: 
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 137–46, 159–73 
(2004). 
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the directors in light of the corporation’s relatively poor 
performance.189 
(2)  Legislators 
Compared to corporate directors, politicians face even 
greater difficulties in designing compensation schemes to align 
their interests with the electorate. Adjustments to congressional 
salaries cannot take effect until after an intervening federal 
election.190 Moreover, corporate performance may be reduced to 
dollars of profit on an income statement or dollars of increase in 
a stock price, for which all shareholders’ interests align. For 
politicians, however, measurements of the public’s general 
welfare may not be readily translated to compensatory bonuses 
or penalties.191 Also, conflicts may arise among blocs of voters 
complicating any compensation scheme.192 
Some special-interest groups advocate for, and some 
politicians support (or acquiesce by signing), political pledges, 
perhaps a pledge to oppose new taxes, to oppose any increase to 
the debt, or to oppose or support abortion.193 Such pledges are 
not enforceable,194 but may serve as a monitoring mechanism 
during a subsequent election, especially where the candidate 
otherwise may lack a record on which to campaign.195 
 
 189. See In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 35, 42, 57 (explaining that, 
although an executive was terminated as a poor fit for the corporation, the 
executive received approximately $91.5 million because his stock options 
increased in value during his brief tenure). 
 190. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII. 
 191. See Davis, supra note 82, at 1150 (“There is no single maximand that 
a public official must pursue . . . .”).  
 192. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, ELECTION 2020: VOTERS ARE HIGHLY 
ENGAGED, BUT NEARLY HALF EXPECT TO HAVE DIFFICULTIES VOTING 35 (Aug. 
13, 2020), https://perma.cc/R2FK-MJVA (PDF) (highlighting that Republicans 
and Democrats express different levels of agreement with their own party on 
specific issues). 
 193. See Altman, supra note 140 (“The political pledge is a handy weapon 
in the political advocate’s arsenal.”). 
 194. Members of Congress are bound by an oath to support the U.S. 
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 195. See Altman, supra note 140. 
Cleveland.Final .docx (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  4:45 PM 
1498 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1463 (2020) 
 
c.  Market Discipline 
Where the market provides meaningful discipline, courts 
may be less inclined to recognize a fiduciary relationship.196 An 
information market and a labor market may discipline a 
fiduciary.197 Those markets are addressed above; an information 
market facilitates monitoring and bonding, and a labor market 
facilitates periodic competitive elections.198 There are other 
markets worth addressing. As an important distinction from the 
political realm, shareholders of publicly-traded corporations 
may easily exit, by selling their shares, or attempt to lessen the 
impact of slack by the directors of one corporation by spreading 
their investment dollars across many corporations.199 Voters 
cannot easily exit one jurisdiction by moving to another 
jurisdiction nor can voters diversify against the risk of a 
misbehaving politician by having many politicians represent 
their district or their state. 
“[D]irectors are to shareholders as legislators are to 
citizens. If there is a fiduciary relationship recognized in the 
former, it is reasonable to recognize a fiduciary relationship in 
the latter.”200 
C.  Distinguishing Corporate Governance from Political 
Governance 
While corporate democracy and political democracy share 
important characteristics, perhaps counseling in favor of the 
usage of corporate common law as an analog to cabin discretion 
by legislators, there are important distinctions between 
corporate democracy and political democracy, perhaps 
undermining the analogy. For starters, federal elections are 
 
 196. See Roberta Romano, Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, “Contract 
and Fiduciary Duty,” 36 J.L. & ECON. 447, 449–50 (1993) (“[H]igh-powered 
incentives provided by markets protect the latter group of principals, making 
the use of a governance structure—the open-ended fiduciary duty adjudicated 
by a court—unnecessary.”). 
 197. See supra Parts III.B.4.a.–b.  
 198. See supra Parts III.B.4.a.–b. 
 199. See Rave, supra note 24, at 707. 
 200. Kim, supra note 25, at 877. 
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premised on “one-person, one-vote,” so no single voter nor small 
group of voters control the outcome of an election.201 Corporate 
elections, however, are premised on “one share-one vote.”202 So, 
a single shareholder could accumulate enough shares to control 
an election of a corporation.203 Moreover, corporations may 
deviate from the default rule of “one share-one vote,” and 
empower one share with multiple votes.204 Consequently, one 
shareholder—say, Mark Zuckerberg—could control the outcome 
of the election of a corporation—say, Facebook—even though 
that shareholder held a minority of outstanding shares.205 This 
corporate-political distinction loses force when shares are 
diffusely and widely held, which more closely approximates the 
political electorate.206 
Federal law does not allow one to “sell” one’s vote;207 and 
many critics have expressed concerns about the possibility of 
“buying” a federal election through indirect means.208 Corporate 
law does not necessarily prohibit the sale of one’s vote.209 More 
directly, one can buy a corporate election, so long as one buys 
enough shares.210 However, where shares are widely and 
 
 201. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2495–96 (2019). 
 202. Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 123 (Del. 1977). 
 203. See Facebook, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 
38 (Apr. 27, 2016) (reporting Mark Zuckerberg’s control of Facebook). 
 204. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (West 2020). 
 205. See Facebook, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 
38 (Apr. 27, 2016) (reporting Zuckerberg’s control of Facebook due to his 
super-voting shares).   
 206. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 25, at 876 (“Shareholders are diffuse [and] 
dispersed . . . .”).   
 207. See 18 U.S.C. § 597; 52 U.S.C. § 10307(c). 
 208. See William McGurn, Opinion, Will Bloomberg Buy the Election?, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2019, 6:47 PM), https://perma.cc/TX6X-AVAA; Jeremy W. 
Peters, Inside the Biggest 2020 Advertising  Against Trump, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://perma.cc/4QPR-ERRR (last updated Jan. 23, 2020).  
 209. See Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 25 (Del. Ch. 1982) (“[T]he 
rationale that vote-buying is, as a matter of public policy, illegal per se is 
founded upon considerations of policy which are now outmoded as a necessary 
result of an evolving corporate environment.”). 
 210. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (regulating tender offers); Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (discussing the tender offer 
for 37 percent of outstanding shares by an investor who already owned more 
than 13 percent of those shares). 
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diffusely held, corporate shareholders more closely resemble the 
political electorate.211 
While a candidate for Congress may run unopposed in a 
primary,212 congressional elections are generally contested. In 
the corporate arena, however, annual elections to fill director 
vacancies are generally not contested.213 Nonetheless, the 
infrequency of contested corporate elections does not mean that 
the law is undeveloped.214 And, those corporate-law cases that 
address directors strategically altering the date of a vote by 
shareholders could guide a court in resolving disputes where 
political incumbents strategically alter the date of a federal 
election.215 
Incumbents—whether corporate directors or federal 
politicians—enjoy financial advantages, relative to their 
challengers, and those incumbents spend “other people’s money” 
in their campaigns.216 Similarly, candidates who challenge 
incumbent federal politicians spend other people’s money when 
campaigning.217 However, shareholders challenging incumbent 
directors for seats on the board expend their own resources 
 
 211. See Kim, supra note 25, at 877. 
 212. See Troy Griggs & Adam Pearce, These 20 Representatives Have Not 
Had a Primary Challenger for at Least a Decade, N.Y. TIMES, https://perma.cc
/KHU2-6VE4 (last updated Sept. 4, 2018) (“Less than 10 percent of 
incumbents get a serious primary challenger, though it’s higher for 
Republicans, at 20 percent . . . .”). 
 213. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 
14A), at 3 (Apr. 27, 2016) (listing eight nominees for eight vacancies); 
Cleveland, supra note 132, at 287 n.379 (noting that a nominee to Chesapeake 
Energy Corporation’s board received only 26 percent of the vote at the annual 
shareholder meeting— the lowest for a nominee of an S&P 500 company in the 
prior five years—but was re-elected because there was no competing candidate 
that received more votes). 
 214. See infra Part 0. 
 215. See infra Part 0. 
 216. See Bill Allison & John McCormick, Trump Leverages Incumbent 
Advantage over Democratic 2020 Pack, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2019, 3:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/5LTM-3TPR (addressing political incumbents); Rosenfeld v. 
Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 292–93 (N.Y. 1955) 
(addressing corporate incumbents).   
 217. But see Alexander Burns, Michael Bloomberg Joins 2020 Democratic 
Field for President, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/4Y6C-FDN4 
(last updated Mar. 4, 2020) (reporting that Bloomberg will not accept political 
donations in his presidential campaign). 
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when campaigning,218 and those campaigns may be 
expensive.219 
Corporate directors exercise judgment with the primary, 
but not necessarily exclusive, goal of benefitting investors 
financially.220 This single-overarching goal may enable courts to 
more effectively scrutinize directors’ decisions relative to 
politicians’ decisions.221 While the political electorate certainly 
is concerned about financial considerations,222 a wide array of 
considerations motivates the voting populace, which, in turn, 
motivates political actors.223 Without a single overarching goal 
to guide political actors, except perhaps a standardless “general 
welfare,” courts may not as easily scrutinize their decisions.224 
This distinction may be overstated. If a court reviews a large 
series of decisions by the board of directors, then the court might 
be able to determine whether those directors were acting in 
 
 218. Corporations could bear such expenses, but generally do not do so. 
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112–113 (West 2020). 
 219. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & RONALD J. GILSON, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 535–36 (8th ed. 2013) (reporting that 
incumbent directors spent $75 million on a proxy campaign); Sharon Terlep & 
David Benoit, P&G Says Trian’s Nelson Peltz Has Lost Bid for Board Seat; He 
Disagrees, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2017, at A7 (reporting that incumbent 
directors spent $35 million on a proxy campaign).   
 220. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 710–12 (2014) 
(listing profit as the “central objective of for-profit corporations,” but 
emphasizing that for-profit corporations may pursue—at the expense of 
profits—charitable causes, energy-conservation goals, and heightened 
employee wages and work conditions). 
 221. See Davis, supra note 80, at 1158; Miller & Gold, supra note 65, at 
523. 
 222. See, e.g., Lily Rothman, The Story Behind George H.W. Bush’s 
Famous “Read My Lips, No New Taxes” Promise, TIME (Dec. 1, 2018, 12:32 
AM), https://perma.cc/X33X-SH4B. 
 223. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, ELECTION 2020: VOTERS ARE HIGHLY 
ENGAGED, BUT NEARLY HALF EXPECT TO HAVE DIFFICULTIES VOTING 35 (Aug. 
13, 2020), https://perma.cc/B79L-WCUK (PDF) (reporting that the top issues 
for voters in 2020 are: the economy, health care, Supreme Court appointments, 
the coronavirus outbreak, violent crime, foreign policy, gun policy, race and 
ethnic inequality, immigration, economic inequality, climate change, and 
abortion). 
 224. See Davis, supra note 80, at 1149 (“[I]n the public law 
context, . . .  unlike its private counterpart, there is not a consensus about the 
interests of beneficiaries . . . .”). 
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furtherance of the shareholders’ financial interests.225 But, if a 
court reviews an isolated decision by the board, then the court 
will be ill-equipped to determine whether the directors 
improperly sacrificed profits if the board pursued some other 
permissible non-profit goal, like charity.226 Thus, a court would 
defer to the directors’ decision to pursue that non-profit goal, 
absent self-interest.227 Self-interest is exactly what would 
prompt a court to second-guess a decision by legislators to shift 
the date of a federal election.228 Review would be limited to 
scenarios, such as where the plaintiff could establish that the 
primary purpose of shifting the date of the federal election was 
the goal of re-election.229 Courts already examine legislative 
purpose in the election context.230 
Some suggest that the clearly-identified beneficiaries of 
directors—shareholders—better enable courts to scrutinize 
directors’ decisions relative to those of legislators.231 Federal 
 
 225. See In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 84–87 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (referencing and upholding a series of decisions by the board).   
 226. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (West 2020) (“Every corporation 
created under this chapter shall have power to . . . [m]ake donations for the 
public welfare or for charitable . . . purposes . . . .”); BUSINESS 
ROUNDTABLE— STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION (Aug. 2019), 
https://perma.cc/84RN-5LAM (superseding prior statements of shareholder 
primacy and stating that the purpose is to create value for 
“all . . . stakeholders,” whose long-term interests are inseparable). 
 227. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). 
 228. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2019).  
 229. See infra Part 0.   
 230. See N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214–15 (4th 
Cir. 2016) (concluding that legislators acted with discriminatory intent); 
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) 
But scrutinizing purpose does make practical sense . . . where an 
understanding of official objective emerges from readily 
discoverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s 
heart of hearts. The eyes that look to purpose belong to an ‘objective 
observer,’ one who takes account of the traditional external signs 
that show up in the ‘text, legislative history, and implementation of 
the statute,’ or comparable official act. (citations omitted). 
 231. See Davis, supra note 80, at 1158 (“[P]rivate fiduciaries owe a single 
beneficiary or a discrete class of beneficiaries a duty of undivided loyalty. It is 
difficult, however, to specify how politicians and bureaucrats are fiduciaries 
for a discrete class of beneficiaries.”); Miller & Gold, supra note 65, at 517, 523 
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legislators may owe duties to citizens (in their districts, states, 
and country), fellow legislators, and the U.S. government.232 
Imposing duties on legislators, without a clearly defined 
beneficiary, may prove a fool’s errand. The distinction may be 
overblown. First, directors owe duties to shareholders and the 
corporation.233 Their interests generally, but not necessarily, 
coincide.234 Even focusing on shareholders, and accepting that 
directors are to maximize profits—a premise that was disputed 
in the prior paragraph—are those directors to maximize 
short-term profits, as favored by some shareholders, like 
activists and perhaps the elderly, or maximize long-term profits, 
as favored by other shareholders, like conservative investors?235 
Directors pick winners among a group of beneficiaries in the 
same sense that legislators, through their policy choices, pick 
winners among a group of beneficiaries.236 Even accepting that 
 
(“All fiduciary mandates imply purposes inasmuch as the fiduciary’s discretion 
is to be oriented to the achievement of certain objectives. However, purposes 
are distinctive in governance mandates insofar as they are not identified with 
determinate persons and their practical interests; they are, in this sense, 
abstract.”); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Democracy’s Boundaries, in 
RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING 
PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 150, 166 (2011) (“Unlike contracts, there is 
not a relatively accessible economic presumption that the parties seek to 
maximize their joint welfare.”). 
 232. See Kim, supra note 25, at 870–71; Ponet, Leib & Serota, supra note 
25, at 94–97; see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943) 
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives 
direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What 
obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed 
to discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of 
his deviation from duty? 
 233. See Davis, supra note 80, at 1163–64 (“Traditionally, courts have 
imposed fiduciary duties on directors in both close and public corporations to 
protect the interests of the corporation and shareholders.”). 
 234. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721–22 (Del. 1971) 
(upholding payment of dividend, which was prompted by the majority 
shareholder’s need for cash, and which payment hobbled the corporation’s 
ability to pursue its business).   
 235. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 
1989) (noting that directors may choose the investment time horizon, whether 
long-term or short-term).  
 236. See Miller & Gold, supra note 65, at 524 (“In some cases . . . we can 
say with reasonable confidence that we know what demographic . . . is 
intended to benefit from a governance mandate . . . .”).   
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federal legislators may owe duties to citizens (in their districts, 
states, and country), fellow legislators, and the U.S. 
government,237 in the context of altering the date of a federal 
election, legislators would infringe on citizens’ rights to vote,238 
so that is the relationship of focus. 
Other differences between the corporate and political 
realms speak to the accountability provided by an election. In 
the corporate realm, by default, each shareholder is empowered 
to vote for every director, and shareholders can oust all of the 
directors at a single election, enhancing accountability of 
directors to shareholders.239 In the political realm, the voters in 
any district or in any state have no right to unseat the vast 
majority of legislators.240 Moreover, given the staggered terms 
of federal legislators,241 the voting populace across all 
jurisdictions cannot unseat all incumbents in a single 
election.242 Perhaps, these distinctions might encourage judicial 
intervention when legislators alter the date of an election, given 
that courts are prepared to intervene when directors alter the 
date of an election.243  
 
 237. See Kim, supra note 25, at 870 n.150 (“[T]he STOCK Act explicitly 
states that members of Congress owe a fiduciary duty ‘to the Congress, the 
United States Government, and the citizens of the United States.’” (quoting 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(g)(1))). 
 238. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). 
 239. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(d), 212, 216 (West 2020). 
 240. See generally United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995) 
(concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge allegedly 
unconstitutionally drawn district where the plaintiff did not live). 
 241. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 242. See Chris Cillizza, You Can’t Vote Everyone in Congress Out. So, What 
Can You Do?, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2013 11:26 AM) https://perma.cc/4ZEP-
MTVH (reporting that 60 percent of people polled said they would “replace 
every member of Congress, including their own, in the next election if they 
could”). 
 243. See infra Part V. 
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IV.  Fiduciary Duties 
A.  Directors 
As fiduciaries, corporate directors owe duties to the 
corporation and its shareholders, namely the duty of care and 
the duty of loyalty.244 Other obligations may be embedded 
within those duties, like the duty of good faith,245 and, in certain 
contexts, those duties may give rise to other obligations.246 
Perhaps most pertinent, because shareholders elect directors, 
equity bars director-fiduciaries from impeding the shareholders’ 
franchise.247 
1.  Duty of Care 
Directors must exercise that amount of care that “ordinarily 
careful and prudent [people] would use in similar 
circumstances,”248 and, when making decisions on behalf of the 
corporation, directors must consider all material information 
reasonably available.249 Courts, however, have created a 
disparity between the standard of conduct and the standard of 
 
 244. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (en banc). 
 245. See id. (“[T]he obligation to act in good faith does not establish an 
independent duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and 
loyalty.”); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1986) (en banc) 
(presuming that the directors acted in good faith when shareholders 
challenged their fulfillment of the duty of care); In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745–46 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[I]ssues of good faith 
are (to a certain degree) inseparably and necessarily intertwined with the 
duties of care and loyalty . . . .”). 
 246. See In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 357 (Del. Ch. 
2008) (“Although usually labeled and described as a duty, the obligation to 
disclose all material facts fairly when seeking shareholder action is merely a 
specific application of the duties of care and loyalty.” (footnotes omitted)); Mills 
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284– 85 (Del. 1989) 
(applying so-called Revlon duties when directors agreed to sell control of the 
corporation for a lesser amount in the face of a superior bid).  
 247. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).  
 248. In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 749. 
 249. See id. 
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liability.250 Courts write in aspirational terms when describing 
the care with which directors should operate, but, when 
shareholders seek to impose personal liability on directors, 
courts require little of directors and require that any 
plaintiff-shareholder establish that the board was grossly 
negligent as to its decision-making process.251 When reviewing 
a shareholder’s challenge to a decision by directors, a court will 
employ the business judgment rule, by which the court defers to 
the directors, and which presumes that the directors acted with 
due care, loyalty, and in good faith.252 Courts do not 
second-guess decisions of disinterested directors, except in the 
mostly theoretical case of an irrational decision.253 While courts 
routinely defer to board decisions, they are much more skeptical 
when a plaintiff-shareholder raises the specter that the 
directors’ decision was tainted by self-interest, which implicates 
the duty of loyalty.254 
 
 250. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct 
and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 437–38 
(1993). 
 251. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 55 (Del. 
2006) (en banc) (describing aspirational, “best practices” that could have been 
employed by a committee of the board and were not employed, but concluding 
that liability required the plaintiff-shareholder to prove “gross negligence,” a 
standard that was not met); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 
A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
What should be understood, but may not widely be understood by 
courts or commentators who are not often required to face such 
questions, is that compliance with a director’s duty of care can never 
appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the content 
of the board decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from 
consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process 
employed. (footnote omitted). 
 252. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360–61 (Del. 1993) 
(“The [business judgment] rule posits a powerful presumption in favor of 
actions taken by the directors in that a decision made by a loyal and informed 
board will not be overturned by the courts unless it cannot be ‘attributed to 
any rational business purpose.’” (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 
717, 720 (Del. 1971))). 
 253. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (en banc) 
(“Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule.”).  
 254. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 362 (discussing the relationship between 
the duty of loyalty and self-interested directors). 
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2.  Duty of Loyalty 
When a shareholder establishes that a decision by the 
directors was tainted by self-interest, a court will not defer to 
the directors because the shareholder overcame a presumption 
of the business judgment rule—the presumed absence of 
self-interest.255 Courts examine self-interest on a 
director-by-director basis.256 Courts’ review of self-interested 
conduct may vary with the circumstances. 
For example, when corporate directors transact with the 
corporation, it is as if those directors are on both sides of the 
transaction — negotiating for themselves and negotiating on 
behalf of the corporation.257 So, when directors cause the 
corporation to pay themselves, whether in fees, bonuses, or 
stock options,258  their divided loyalties invite court review, with 
the burden falling on the interested directors to establish 
fairness.259 Fairness might be established via authorization by 
disinterested directors, approval by disinterested shareholders, 
or comparable market transactions.260 
The fairness inquiry may not be applicable in 
self-interested scenarios when directors do not transact with the 
corporation. For example, in the past, when a hostile acquirer 
made a premium offer to shareholders for their shares and the 
board of directors defended against that acquisition, and a 
shareholder challenged the board’s defensive action, courts 
initially struggled whether to be deferential to the board under 
the business judgment rule, or to be skeptical of the board’s 
 
 255. See In re Invs. Bancorp, Inc. S’holder Litig., 177 A.3d 1208, 1217 (Del. 
2017) (en banc). 
 256. See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 818 (Del. 2019); Beam v. 
Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004). 
 257. See In re Invs. Bancorp, Inc., 177 A.3d at 1217. 
 258. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 122, 141(h), 157 (West 2020). 
 259. See In re Invs. Bancorp, Inc., 177 A.3d at 1217 (holding that, when 
board members fix  their compensation, the decision will generally “lie outside 
the business judgment rule’s presumptive protection” (quoting Texlon Corp. v. 
Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 257 (Del. 2002))). 
 260. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144. 
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defensive action under the fairness inquiry.261 What if the court 
was deferential and upheld the board’s defenses, but the board 
members were acting self-interestedly to preserve their 
positions, not loyally to the corporation and its shareholders, as 
the hostile acquirer would have lined the shareholders’ pockets 
and increased the value of the corporation? On the other hand, 
what if the court was skeptical of the board’s loyalty and 
invalidated the board’s defenses, but the hostile acquirer paid 
too little to the shareholders for their shares or the acquirer took 
actions that harmed the corporation? Consequently, in Unocal 
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,262 the Delaware Supreme Court 
created an intermediate inquiry, requiring the board to 
establish that it undertook a good-faith, reasonable 
investigation; that the hostile acquirer posed a threat to the 
corporation, its shareholders, or a significant corporate policy; 
and that the defensive action was proportional to the threat, not 
coercive nor preclusive.263 The court’s inquiry addressed the 
“omnipresent specter” that the directors, in defending against 
an acquirer, might be acting to preserve their positions, and 
further their own interests, rather than the interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders.264 
Most relevant for present purposes, and as will be explained 
in Part IV.A.4, a court may find that the duty of loyalty is 
implicated when directors strategically alter the date of an 
election, but the court may not invoke the “fairness” inquiry. 
Instead, if the plaintiff-shareholder can establish that the 
primary purpose of the directors’ action was to impede the 
shareholders’ franchise, then the court will require the directors 
to establish compelling justification for their action.265 
 
 261. See Eisenberg, supra note 250, at 458 (“Over the last twenty years, 
corporation law has tried to come to grips with the hostile tender offer—that 
is, a general offer to purchase all or a controlling amount of a corporation’s 
shares from the shareholders, over management’s objections.”). 
 262. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 263. See id. at 958–59. 
 264. See id. at 954. 
 265. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 662 (Del. Ch. 
1988). 
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3.  Duty of Good Faith 
Directors must act in good faith to further the interests of 
the corporation and its shareholders.266 Action designed to 
violate the law or to harm the corporation results in a violation 
of the directors’ duty.267 Moreover, directors do not act in good 
faith if they consciously disregard a known duty to act.268 For 
example, because DGCL provides that the business and affairs 
of a corporation shall be managed by, or under the direction of, 
the board of directors,269 those directors must erect an 
information-and-reporting system reasonably designed to 
provide the board with timely, accurate information to reach 
informed judgments regarding the corporation’s business 
performance and its compliance with law.270 As with the duty of 
care, with respect to the board’s oversight obligations, there is a 
disparity between the standard of conduct and the standard of 
liability.271 Even though the standard of conduct references 
“reasonabl[eness],” shareholders face great difficulties in trying 
to impose personal liability on directors for failures of 
oversight.272 Shareholders must establish that “the directors 
utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system 
or controls; or . . . having implemented such a system or 
controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations 
thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or 
problems requiring their attention.”273  
 
 266. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (en banc). 
 267. See id. at 370; In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative Litig., No. 5430, 
2011 WL 2176479, at *21 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011).  
 268. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 269. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2020). 
 270. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. 
Ch. 1996). 
 271. Compare id. (referencing reasonably designed oversight system), with 
Stone, 911 A.2d at 372 (holding that, to impose personal liability, the plaintiff 
must show “sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight”).  
 272. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 372 (“[A] claim that directors are subject to 
personal liability for employee failures is ‘possibly the most difficult theory in 
corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.’” 
(quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967)). 
 273. Id. at 370. 
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4.  Duty Barring Action with Inequitable Purpose 
“[W]here corporate directors exercise their legal powers for 
an inequitable purpose their action may be rescinded or 
nullified by a court at the instance of an aggrieved 
shareholder.”274 Thus, directors may be informed (and otherwise 
in compliance with the duty of care), and act in good faith to 
further the corporation’s interests, not their own interests (in 
compliance with the duties of good faith and loyalty), yet a court 
may still invalidate their action, if the action furthers an 
inequitable purpose.275 The Delaware Supreme Court 
announced this principle in a case in which the directors 
strategically altered the date of an election, due to the 
significance of the shareholder franchise.276 “The shareholder 
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the 
legitimacy of directorial power rests.”277 Courts defer to 
decisions of the board of directors under the business judgment 
rule, in part, because the shareholders elected those directors, 
and soon those shareholders will have the opportunity to elect 
new directors.278 If, however, the directors impede the 
shareholders’ ability to vote, then critical support for the 
business judgment rule is weakened.279 Given the “central 
importance of the [shareholder] franchise to the scheme of 
 
 274. Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1121 (Del. Ch. 1990); see 
FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 256 (“Doctrinally, equity is the source of the 
remedies for violations of fiduciary obligations, because fiduciary obligations 
originated in the English equity courts.”). 
 275. See Stahl, 579 A.2d at 1121 (“An inequitable purpose is not 
necessarily synonymous with a dishonest motive. Fiduciaries who are 
subjectively operating selflessly might be pursuing a purpose that a court will 
rule is inequitable.”).   
 276. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) 
(“[M]anagement has attempted to utilize the corporate machinery and the 
Delaware Law . . . for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate efforts of 
dissident stockholders in the exercise of their rights to undertake a proxy 
contest against management. These are inequitable purposes, contrary to 
established principles of corporate democracy.”); Stahl, 579 A.2d at 1121 
(describing Schnell as the leading case on the matter). 
 277. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 278. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (West 2020) (establishing, by 
default, a one-year term for directors).   
 279. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659–60. 
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corporate governance,”280 courts require that the board of 
directors establish compelling justification for its action, if a 
shareholder initially establishes that the board of directors 
acted with a primary purpose of impeding effective voting by 
shareholders.281   
Any inquiry into purpose could become a blunderbuss 
weapon in the hands of plaintiff-shareholders (inviting 
non-meritorious litigation), and any inquiry guided by equity 
could become a means of unbridled court intervention 
(inconsistent with the business judgment rule).282 However, two 
limits merit mention. First, although the principle is phrased 
broadly,283 the cases in which courts have resorted to this 
principle typically involved a contested election,284 which is 
atypical in the corporate realm, so the courts’ application of the 
principle has been limited.285 Second, the courts’ own inquiry 
limits its application286: the plaintiff-shareholder must establish 
that the primary purpose of the board’s action was to impede 
the exercise of the shareholders’ franchise before the board is 
 
 280. Id. at 659. 
 281. See id. at 661–62.  
 282. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360–61 (Del. 1993) 
(explaining that the business judgment rule “operates to preclude a court from 
imposing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation”).  
 283. See Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439 (“[I]nequitable action does not become 
permissible simply because it is legally possible.”). 
 284. See Stahl, 579 A.2d at 1121–22 (collecting cases).   
 285. See Ala. By-Prods. Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 258 n.1 (Del. 1991) 
The invocation of equitable principles to override established 
precepts of Delaware corporate law must be exercised with caution 
and restraint. Otherwise, the stability of Delaware law is imperiled. 
While the doctrine of [Schnell] is an important part of our 
jurisprudence, its application, or that of similar concepts, should be 
reserved for those instances that threaten the fabric of the law, or 
which by an improper manipulation of the law, would deprive a 
person of a clear right. (citation omitted). 
 286. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1130 (Del. 2003) 
(“[T]he non-deferential Blasius standard of enhanced judicial review, which 
imposes upon a board of directors the burden of demonstrating a compelling 
justification for such actions, is rarely applied . . . .”). 
Cleveland.Final .docx (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  4:45 PM 
1512 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1463 (2020) 
 
required to establish compelling justification.287 If, for example, 
the directors delay a vote by shareholders  — which vote might 
have unseated the incumbent directors — primarily to pursue a 
merger that the directors believe is in the shareholders’ 
interests, then the “compelling justification” standard is not 
applicable.288 Moreover, the “compelling justification” standard, 
though difficult for directors to meet, has been met,289 so it is 
not, by analogy, “strict in theory, [but] fatal in fact.”290 These 
cases and the attendant circumstances will be addressed in 
subpart V.A. 
B.  Legislators 
If classified as fiduciaries, federal legislators would be 
subject to the traditional duties of care, loyalty, and good 
faith.291 The Founders wrote of expectations of legislators, which 
correspond to those traditional fiduciary duties.292 Modern 
scholars similarly argue that such duties apply to federal 
 
 287. See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1121–22; Allen v. 
Prime Comput., Inc., 540 A.2d 417, 420 (Del. 1988). Delaware courts 
distinguish between an action’s purpose and the directors’ intent. See Linton 
v. Everett, No. 15219, 1997 WL 441189, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997) (“To set 
aside the election results on the basis of inequitable manipulation of the 
corporate machinery, it is not required that scienter, i.e., actual subjective 
intent to impede the voting process, be shown.”). 
 288. In such circumstances, a “reasonableness” standard may be 
applicable. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–56 
(Del. 1985). However, actions by directors routinely survive such “reasonable” 
scrutiny. See, e.g., id. at 950 (“[W]e are satisfied that the device Unocal 
adopted is reasonable in relation to the threat posed . . . .”). 
 289. See Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 788 (Del. Ch. 2007).   
 290. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1972) (internal quotations omitted). 
 291. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 286 (“The different views 
concerning the fiduciary laws, both private and governmental, related to 
where the lines should be drawn rather than to the principles to be followed.”); 
Miller & Gold, supra note 65, at 556 (“[F]iduciaries acting under governance 
mandates are obligated to be loyal . . . .”). 
 292. See Natelson, supra note 75, at 1137, 1142–58 (discussing the 
Founders’ understanding of fiduciary concepts, such as the duties of 
reasonable care, loyalty, and impartiality, and how that understanding 
informed their drafting of the Constitution). 
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legislators.293 Legislators may owe duties to citizens (in their 
districts, states, or country), fellow legislators, and the U.S. 
government.294 In the context of altering the date of a federal 
election, legislators might infringe on citizens’ rights to vote, so 
that is the relationship of focus, in the same way that directors 
might infringe on shareholders’ rights to vote, giving rise to a 
direct, not a derivative, cause of action.295 
1.  Duty of Care 
Members of Congress are expected to act with due 
care — not irrationally.296 When fulfilling their responsibilities, 
like monitoring the other branches and enacting legislation,297 
members of Congress require information, which they may 
gather by meeting with colleagues, agencies, constituents, and 
lobbyists and by convening formal hearings.298 Members of 
Congress test their ideas through debate and by proposing 
 
 293. See Galoob & Leib, supra note 65, at 164 (arguing that fiduciary 
duties are a means of constraining political actors); Natelson, supra note 75, 
at 1137, 1142–58, 1178 (same); Ponet & Leib, supra note 79, at 1257–61 
(same).  
 294. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 332 (2004) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“Elected officials[’] . . . primary obligations are, of course, to the 
public in general . . . .”); Kim, supra note 25, at 870–71 (“Consider the 
following potential beneficiaries [of legislators]: citizens, the legislature (and 
fellow legislators), and the government that the legislator serves.”). 
 295. See In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. S’holder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 
1049–50 (Del. Ch. 2015). 
 296. See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 359 (2009) 
(subjecting legislation that did not infringe a fundamental right to rational 
basis review); Natelson, supra note 75, at 1142–45 (discussing duty of care); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (discussing 
a fiduciary-agent’s duties of care, competence, and diligence); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 (AM. L. INST. 2012) (imposing on a fiduciary-trustee the 
duty of prudence which “requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and 
caution”). 
 297. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1; 2, cl. 5; 3, cl. 6. 
 298. See Natelson, supra note 75, at 1142 (“James Madison stressed the 
need for officials to acquire sufficient knowledge to execute their 
functions . . . .”). 
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legislation.299 Just as directors are entrusted with discretion to 
reject the preferences of shareholders —  recognizing that 
shareholders soon will vote upon their retention, members of 
Congress are entrusted with discretion to reject the preferences 
of their constituents — recognizing that those constituents soon 
will vote upon their retention.300 The quantum of care with 
which members of Congress must act is contextual. For 
example, following the events of 9/11, members of Congress may 
have felt the need to take swift action, which may have inhibited 
their ability to gather all desirable information and to deeply 
consider the viewpoints of competing constituencies.301 
However, having taken swift action, and including “sunset” 
provisions,302 members of Congress should have, and did, 
pause—devoting additional efforts to inform themselves, 
consider alternative viewpoints, and debate the statute’s 
impact—before continuing the effect of those provisions.303 This 
Article presumes that, before amending the U.S. Code to alter 
the date of any federal election, members of Congress would 
gather information and consider alternatives. Though certain 
members of Congress may not be acting loyally, in good faith, or 
 
 299. See Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Senate Votes Down Broad 
Obamacare Repeal, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/3L62-HH9N 
(describing the intense floor debate surrounding the repeal of the Affordable 
Care Act).  
 300. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 
U.S. 787, 793– 94 (2015) (distinguishing a representative government from a 
New England town hall meeting). 
 301. In response to 9/11, and just a few weeks thereafter, Congress passed 
the USA Patriot Act on October 26, 2011. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. 
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
U.S.C.).  
 302. See id. § 224 (“[Except as noted,] this title and the amendments made 
by this title . . . shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2005.”). 
 303. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-174, at 5 (2005) (detailing four years of 
oversight, including hearing testimony, DOJ reports, briefings, and other 
correspondence); see also USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified in 
scattered sections of U.S.C.); Reauthorization of the Patriot Act: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2001); DEP’T OF JUST., USA PATRIOT ACT: 
SUNSET REPORT (Apr. 2005).   
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equitably, those members would likely be acting rationally and 
with due care. 
2.  Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty requires a fiduciary to further the 
beneficiary’s interest, not to further the fiduciary’s own 
interests at the expense of the beneficiary.304 Moreover, the 
fiduciary cannot benefit herself, even if the beneficiary is not 
harmed, if the fiduciary exploits her position to gain that 
advantage.305 The duty of loyalty is reflected in the U.S. 
Constitution, which includes provisions designed to prevent 
legislators from increasing their own compensation, and to 
prevent their corruption by other branches and by foreign 
influences.306   
The Founders—whether Federalists or 
Anti-Federalists— articulated their concerns that legislators’ 
loyalties would be tested.307 Madison wrote, “When a strong 
personal interest happens to be opposed to the general interest, 
the Legislature cannot be too much distrusted.”308 Hamilton 
argued that it should be “as difficult as possible for [legislators] 
to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good.”309 
An Anti-Federalist publication argued that “those, who are 
 
 304. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317–18 (2004) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (articulating legislators’ “duty” to govern impartially); 63C AM. 
JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 1 (2020) (“Public offices are created 
for the purpose of effecting the end for which government has been instituted, 
which is the common good, and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of 
any one person, family, or class of persons.”). 
 305. See Kim, supra note 25, at 904–08 (collecting and analyzing cases); 
see also Natelson, supra note 75, at 1153 (acknowledging that public officials 
necessarily favor one group over another, but noting that, “[e]ven 
when . . . [favoring a particular group] was not technically illegal, it [could be] 
a violation of the public trust”). 
 306. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; id. amend. XXVII; see also Natelson, 
supra note 75, at 1148 (addressing the length-of-residency requirement for 
senators and the natural-born citizen requirement for the President). 
 307. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 99–106 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1937). 
 308. Id. at 104 (quoting James Madison, Journal (July 24, 1787)). 
 309. THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961). 
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entrusted with the exercise of the higher powers of government, 
ought to . . . hav[e] no other view than the general good of all 
without any regard to private interest.”310   
The Founders contemplated several remedies if legislators 
self-interestedly abused their power.311 The co-equal branches 
might check legislators’ self-interested legislation via the 
presidential veto or court review.312 Additionally, legislators 
collectively might discipline individual legislators via 
impeachment.313 Finally, the electorate may vote out of office 
those who abuse their office.314 If, however, legislators 
self-interestedly alter the date of a federal election, court review 
may be the only effective check on those legislators. If the 
President and the self-interested legislators are of the same 
political party, then the President may support, not veto, such 
legislation.315 (Plus, a presidential veto may be overridden.316) 
To be enacted, (self-interested) legislation must enjoy the 
support of a majority of legislators in each congressional 
chamber, such that impeachment on the basis of the enacted 
legislation would never occur, where impeachment requires the 
majority of one chamber and a supermajority in the other 
chamber.317 The concept of strategically altering the date of a 
 
 310. Natelson, supra note 75, at 1157 (quoting the Antifederalist Impartial 
Examiner). 
 311. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (ABA Classics ed., 
2009). 
 312. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 
173– 80 (1803).  
 313. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 314. Compare Nicholas Fandos, Trump Acquitted of Two Impeachment 
Charges in Near Party-Line Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/Q9NN-DSDC (reporting that the Senate acquitted President 
Trump of charges that he abused his power and obstructed Congress), with 
Meg Wagner, et al., Joe Biden Elected President, CNN, https://perma.cc/8LB7-
7BEG (last updated Nov. 8, 2020, 10:29 A.M.) (reporting that citizens did not 
re-elect President Trump).   
 315. See Alan Greenblatt, 5 Reasons Vetoes Have Gone Out of Style, NAT’L. 
PUB. RADIO (May 9, 2013), https://perma.cc/P6N6-D7EA.  
 316. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.  
 317. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (granting the House of Representatives the 
power of impeachment); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“[N]o Person shall be convicted [of 
impeachment] without the Concurrence of two thirds of the [Senators] 
present.”). 
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federal election is to ensure an outcome favorable to the 
self-interested incumbents, so the election itself would prove a 
poor check on such self-interested behavior, and any subsequent 
election could be strategically timed. Consequently, judicial 
review may be essential as a check on legislative abuse.318 
While judicial review may be essential, the nature of that 
review could take many forms. By analogizing politicians to 
corporate directors, scholars have suggested that judicial 
application of corporate law principles of the duty of loyalty 
could curb legislators’ self-interested acts.319 In the corporate 
setting, when plaintiff-shareholders establish self-interested 
action by directors, courts commonly require those directors to 
establish “fairness,” whether procedural fairness (approval of 
the action by disinterested directors or shareholders) or 
substantive fairness (proof that the terms of the self-interested 
action are comparable to the terms that would have been 
negotiated by unrelated parties).320   
For example, with respect to partisan gerrymandering, 
Rave argues that legislators violate their duty of loyalty and 
should be subject to the “fairness” inquiry.321 Rave considers 
state legislators to be interested when drawing federal districts 
designed to benefit federal legislators.322 Rave acknowledges 
that, under Madisonian principles, state legislators and federal 
legislators are independent, with different interests and 
responsive to different constituencies.323 Rave, however, 
contends that state legislators are subject to the control of 
national political parties, which may choose to support a rival 
 
 318. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5 (“[W]here the political process is 
unlikely to work, . . . judicial enforcement of the Constitution is most 
important.”).  
 319. See Kim, supra note 25, at 893–908; Rave, supra note 24, at 708–23. 
 320. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2020). 
 321. See Rave, supra note 24, at 671 (“[P]olitical representatives should be 
treated as fiduciaries, subject to a duty of loyalty, which they breach when 
they manipulate election laws to their own advantage. Courts can thus check 
incumbent self-dealing in gerrymandering by taking a cue from corporate law 
strategies for getting around their institutional incompetence.”). 
 322. Id. at 686 (“In a world with national political parties, members of 
Congress have an interest in state elections and state legislators have an 
interest in congressional elections.”). 
 323. Id. at 685.   
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candidate in the primary, if the incumbent strays.324 When a 
corporate director is beholden to another person, courts are 
concerned that the director will not exercise discretion to further 
the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.325 Rave 
convincingly argues that state legislators may be beholden to 
national political parties; however, he is less convincing that 
any such pressure impacts the state legislators’ exercise of 
discretion when drawing federal districts,326 because, under 
corporate law, courts are not troubled by directors, who act to 
further the best interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders, but along the way further their own interests.327 
Rave does not persuade the reader that state legislators would 
behave differently with respect to establishing federal districts 
due to the theoretical pressures exerted by the national political 
parties, than those state legislators would have done in the 
absence of any such pressure.328 State legislators of a political 
party generally believe that the country and their constituents 
would be better served if members of their party represented 
those newly-crafted federal districts.329 So, by strategically 
drawing federal districts, state legislators would be fulfilling 
their duty of loyalty by furthering the interests of their 
constituents and the country, not violating their duty of loyalty. 
 
 324. Id. at 686. 
 325. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004) (en banc).  
 326. Rave, supra note 24, at 686 (“If individual state legislators do not 
want to go along with a congressional gerrymander . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 327. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721–22 (Del. 1971) 
(applying the “fairness” inquiry when the fiduciary benefits to the detriment 
of the beneficiary, but “fairness” is not applicable when directors take action 
that benefits all shareholders, including themselves); see also Pildes, supra 
note 22, at 135 (discussing the problem of causation). 
 328. See Rave, supra note 24, at 686; see also Pildes, supra note 22, at 135 
(“Corruption might have meant that legislators had shifted their votes in 
response to contributions, or that the legislative agenda had been altered as a 
result of such contributions, or that the judgment of policymakers had been 
altered in some other way.”). 
 329. See Jonathan Rauch, The Gerrymandering Ruling Was Bad, but the 
Alternatives Were Worse, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/8RXK-
R4HT (“‘I think electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats,’ David 
Lewis, a Republican member of the North Carolina general assembly, told a 
redistricting committee. ‘So I drew this map to help foster what I think is 
better for the country.’”). 
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Though courts should review partisan gerrymandering with 
skepticism, the “fairness” inquiry may not be the appropriate 
corporate law analog. Nor is the “fairness” inquiry the 
appropriate corporate law analog for the judicial review of a 
strategic legislative shift of a federal election. 
Unlike partisan gerrymandering by state legislators that 
impacts other individuals (federal legislators), this Article 
addresses action by federal legislators—altering the date of a 
federal election—that impacts themselves. So, on a first-pass 
analysis, the duty of loyalty is more directly implicated, but 
ultimately may not justify judicial intrusion under the 
“fairness” inquiry.330 Recall that, under corporate law, a court 
undertakes the self-interested inquiry on a director-by-director 
basis.331 If one undertakes the self-interested inquiry on a 
federal-legislator-by-federal-legislator basis, many—likely a 
majority of federal legislators—will not be self-interested. Some 
federal legislators do not intend to run for re-election,332 so their 
self-interest is not apparent by an alteration of the date of the 
next election. Because senators serve six-year terms, most 
senators will not be up for re-election at the next federal 
election,333 so their self-interest is not apparent. And many of 
those members of the Senate who are up for re-election will not 
face meaningful challenge at that election.334 So, their 
re-election chances are not impacted by whether the election 
occurs before early November or after early November, and thus 
their self-interest is not apparent. The same holds true for the 
many members of the House who will not face meaningful 
 
 330. See infra Part 0. 
 331. See Beam, 845 A.2d at 1049 (“The independence inquiry requires us 
to determine whether there is a reasonable doubt that any one of these three 
directors is capable of objectively making [the pertinent] business 
decision . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 332. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Jeff Flake, a Fierce Trump Critic, Will 
Not Seek Re-election for Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc
/R6DW-XDMB. 
 333. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.  
 334. See Rotenberg, supra note 175 (“[A]lmost two-thirds of Senate 
contests this cycle start as ‘safe’ for the incumbent party and are likely to 
remain that way.”). 
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challenge in the next election.335 A court would presume that 
federal legislators are disinterested, and approval by 
disinterested legislators would cleanse any self-interested 
action.336  Whether a challenger could overcome those hurdles is 
in doubt.337 
In the corporate setting, courts acknowledge the presence 
of self-interest of directors seeking re-election.338 Nonetheless, 
courts will not presume that a director’s interest in seeking 
re-election is not in furtherance of the best interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders.339 A desire to continue serving 
with like-minded colleagues is not a disabling self-interest that 
triggers judicial scrutiny under the “fairness” inquiry.340 So, 
even though courts may be willing to intervene when incumbent 
directors manipulate election mechanics and may reference a 
violation of the duty of loyalty, courts do not employ the 
 
 335. See Bedard, supra note 175 (“The first analysis of the upcoming 2020 
congressional election shows that already nearly 8 in 10 members are in “safe 
districts . . . .”).  
 336. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2020) (indicating that 
“affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the 
disinterested directors [are] less than a quorum” cleanses self-interested 
action by one or more board members).   
 337. Cf. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004) (en banc) (“[T]he 
plaintiff has the burden to plead particularized facts that create a reasonable 
doubt sufficient to rebut the presumption that . . . [any of the three directors 
were] independent.”). 
 338. See Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206–07 (Del. Ch. 
1987) (“A candidate for office, whether as an elected official or as a director of 
a corporation, is likely to prefer to be elected rather than defeated. He 
therefore has a personal interest in the outcome of the election even if the 
interest is not financial . . . .”). 
 339. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 658 (Del. Ch. 
1988) (“[The board] acted . . . in a good faith effort to protect its incumbency, 
not selfishly . . . .”); Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 17637, 2000 WL 
1805376, at *19 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (finding “no clear conflict of interest 
between the directors and the shareholders”). 
 340. See Aprahamian, 531 A.2d at 1206 (“[I]ncumbent 
directors . . . seeking reelection . . . are obviously interested in the outcome of 
the election . . . . In terming these directors ‘interested’ I am not ascribing any 
improprieties to them.”). 
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“fairness” inquiry.341 Rather than applying the “fairness” 
inquiry to any review of legislative action to shift an election, 
courts should consider applying the inquiry introduced in Part  
IV.A.4, which will be examined in Part V. 
3.  Duty of Good Faith 
Federal legislators are required to take an oath to support 
the Constitution and that oath includes a good faith 
requirement.342 Under corporate law, a violation of good faith 
requires (1) intentional illegality, (2) intent to harm, or (3) a 
conscious disregard of a known duty to act.343 Extending this 
analysis to federal legislators, there currently is no 
clearly-defined legal obligation that bars legislators from 
strategically altering the date of a federal election.344 Second, by 
strategically altering the date of an election, legislators 
arguably intend to disenfranchise certain voters or at least 
lessen the effect of their vote.345 More accurately, however, the 
intent of the incumbents—most of whom are not up for 
re-election or do not face meaningful challenge—may be to 
perpetuate their vision and policies, which, in their good faith 
beliefs, operate for the betterment of the country and the 
 
 341. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660–63 (requiring that directors establish 
“compelling justification” when acting with the “primary purpose of thwarting 
the exercise of a shareholder vote”); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 
1115, 1121 (Del. Ch. 1990) (“Fiduciaries who are subjectively operating 
selflessly might be pursuing a purpose that a court will rule is inequitable.”).  
 342. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and 
Representatives . . . shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution.”); 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (“I will . . . faith[fully support and defend the 
Constitution]; and . . . faithfully discharge the duties of the office.”). 
 343. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64–67 (Del. 
2006) (en banc); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (en banc). Such 
claims generally are not fruitful for plaintiff-shareholders. See id. at 372 
(stating that such a claim is “the most difficult theory in corporation law upon 
which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment”). 
 344. See Alexander Burns, Trump Attacks an Election He Is at Risk of 
Losing, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/HA64-SHX6 (reporting 
that the power to move the date of the election rests with Congress and that 
the “timing of federal elections has been fixed since the 19th century”).   
 345. See infra Part 0. 
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population.346 (Mixed motives may emerge, but it is the primary 
purpose of the legislation, not legislators’ primary motive, that 
would drive judicial review.)347 Third, with respect to conscious 
disregard of a known duty to act, the allegation, in the corporate 
setting, typically emerges in cases where the board fails to 
monitor employees, who commit illegal acts.348 The corporate 
analogy regarding monitoring does not apply meaningfully to 
legislators strategically altering the date of a federal election. 
Nonetheless, conscious disregard of a known duty to act may 
apply to other acts by legislators,349 which are beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
 
 346. See supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
 347. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative 
Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 525 (2016) (arguing that “courts should never 
invalidate legislation solely because the legislature acted with forbidden 
intentions”); id. at 528 (noting that intent may be considered, “for example, in 
cases in which an absolute majority of the legislature acts with forbidden 
intent”); Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 843, 846 
(“[P]roof of bad [legislative] intent should be neither necessary nor sufficient 
for an election law challenge to succeed, though it should be relevant in getting 
courts to take a hard look at election laws. Rather . . . courts should primarily 
examine the effect of election laws . . . .”); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 
109, 132 (1986) (plurality opinion) (addressing the effect of legislation); Rucho 
v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2514 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
districters have set out to reduce the weight of certain citizens’ votes, and 
thereby deprive them of their capacity to ‘full[y] and effective[ly] participat[e] 
in the political process[].’” (alterations in original)); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 
267, 318 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen partisanship is the 
legislature’s sole motivation—when any pretense of neutrality is forsaken 
unabashedly . . . —the governing body cannot be said to have acted 
impartially.”); id. at 350 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I would, however, treat any 
showing of intent in a major-party case as too equivocal to count unless the 
entire legislature were controlled by the governor’s party (or the dominant 
legislative party were vetoproof).”); Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of 
Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1161 (2018) (“[M]otives inquiries are easier 
to administer than commonly believed. Most motive standards do not require 
the factfinder to excavate and weigh all motives, nor to predict counterfactual 
results if one motive or the other were subtracted[,] . . . because most motive 
standards focus on only one motive as directly relevant.”); id. at 1134–43 
(noting the seeming simplicity of intent inquiries: any, but for, primary, sole).   
 348. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 364–65; In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative 
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 960 (Del. Ch. 1996).  
 349. See Ian Lovett, Oregon Police Seek GOP Senators, WALL ST. J., June 
21, 2019, at A4  
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4.  Duty Barring Action with Inequitable Purpose 
In certain respects, the duties of care, loyalty, and good 
faith are broad, free-ranging, and highly contextual.350 While 
judges, lawyers, and professors routinely resort to analogies as 
intuitive and persuasive, analogies may be overbroad, and may 
lack firm foundational similarities.351 This section strengthens 
 
[T]he entire GOP Senate delegation . . . left the state and went into 
hiding . . . in an attempt to stop a cap-and-trade bill to address 
climate change from passing. . . . [T]he Senate cannot achieve a 
quorum without at least some of the Republicans and therefore 
cannot vote on the climate legislation without them.  
Nick Madigan, On the Lam, Texas Democrats Rough It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 
2003), https://perma.cc/DJ8W-THZ4 (reporting that eleven Democratic state 
senators fled Texas to deny their Republican counterparts a quorum in an 
attempt to prevent a redistricting effort); Bob Bauer, Can the Senate Decline 
to Try an Impeachment Case?, LAWFARE (Jan. 21, 2019, 11:10 AM), https://
perma.cc/7DKD-RCKK 
[T]he Senate does have this duty to try any impeachment voted by 
the House. . . . But such a duty is not the same as a clear-cut 
constitutional obligation expressed in the text, and, depending on 
events and their political impacts, the Republicans may be 
motivated to exploit the difference. . . . No one disputes that there 
is no judicial remedy or other means of enforcing the constitutional 
duty . . . . 
Compare Carl Hulse, That Supreme Court Stonewall May Not Crumble 
Anytime Soon, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/554H-P9WX  
The idea of denying Mrs. Clinton a court pick has been quietly 
simmering in conservative circles as Republicans held firm in their 
refusal to take up the president’s nomination of Merrick B. Garland 
before the election. . . . Senator Richard M. Burr of North 
Carolina . . . promis[ed] to “do everything I can do to make sure four 
years from now, we still got an opening on the Supreme Court.”  
with Brian Naylor, McConnell Would Fill Potential Supreme Court Vacancy in 
2020, Reversal of 2015 Stance, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 29, 2019, 10:50 AM), 
https://perma.cc/VMX6-XUCE (reporting  a reversal by Senate Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnell, a Republican, who refused to allow the Senate to 
consider a Supreme Court nominee by a Democratic President during the 2016 
presidential campaign, but who would allow the Senate to consider and 
confirm a Republican nominee during the 2020 presidential campaign).   
 350. See supra Part 0.  
 351. See Kim, supra note 25, at 853, 892–93 (noting that zebras may be 
viewed as analogous to barber poles because both are striped); Richard A. 
Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORNELL L REV. 761, 765 (2006) (“One 
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the director-legislator analogy by examining foundational 
similarities. 
A court will defer to a rational decision by a corporation’s 
board of directors, when a shareholder challenges the decision, 
in part, because judges—trained in law—are not well-suited to 
second-guess policy decisions by directors, and because the 
shareholders elected those directors, and soon those 
shareholders can elect new directors.352 If, however, the 
directors impede the shareholders’ ability to vote, then a critical 
check on director discretion goes wanting, and courts act to 
preserve the shareholders’ statutory authority to vote.353 
Similarly, courts defer to rational decisions by legislators, in 
part, because judges—trained in law—are not well-suited to 
second-guess policy decisions by legislators, and because the 
voters elected those legislators, and soon those voters can elect 
new legislators.354 Akin to the foundational importance of 
director elections to corporate governance, “[e]lection day . . . is 
the foundation of democratic governance.”355 “Voters . . . choose 
their representatives, not the other way around.”356 Legislators, 
 
always requires a general understanding of some sort in order to determine 
relevant similarities. In a legal case it is an understanding of rules, principles, 
doctrines, and policies. It is they that do the work in reasoning by analogy.”); 
Ponet, Leib & Serota, supra note 25, at 92–93 (critiquing another scholar’s 
work for making “too-direct” a comparison of fiduciary concepts to election 
law). 
 352. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (West 2020) (contemplating that, 
by default, each director serves a one-year term); id. § 141(a) (allocating 
decision-making authority to the board of directors, not the court); Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (en banc) (“Irrationality is the outer limit 
of the business judgment rule.”).   
 353. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1130–1131 (Del. 2003) 
(requiring that directors establish “compelling justification” when “the 
primary purpose of the board’s action is to interfere with” the shareholders’ 
right to vote).  
 354. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII, cl. 1; id. amend. 
XXIV, § 1. 
 355. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2512 (2019) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
 356. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. 
Ct. 2652, 2677 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Mitchell N. 
Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 781 (2005)); see THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 199 (James Madison) (ABA Classics ed., 2009) 
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through manipulation of election mechanics, cannot be 
permitted to “rig[] elections,” otherwise democracy is 
imperiled.357 “[A]ny alleged infringement of the right of citizens 
to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”358 
By strategically altering the date of a federal election, 
incumbent legislators might act to ensure their 
re-election.359 The Founders— both Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists— acknowledged this problem.360 It was argued 
that the legislature ought not be capable of “alter[ing] itself by 
modifying the elections of its own members.”361  Otherwise, the 
“great law of self-preservation will prevail.”362 In The Federalist 
No. 60, Hamilton acknowledged that incumbent legislators, by 
establishing the time of an election, might perpetuate their rule, 
and, as a remedy, he envisioned—what today seems an 
unrealistic solution—“an immediate revolt of the great body of 
the people.”363 Akin to limitations on directors under corporate 
law, legislators should not be permitted to deprive voters of their 
capacity for “full and effective participation in the political 
process.”364 Part V will argue for extending the “primary 
purpose-compelling justification” inquiry, which was introduced 
 
(“[R]epublican liberty . . . [requires] that those intrusted [sic] with [power] 
should be kept in dependence on the people . . . .” (citation omitted)).   
 357. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 358. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). 
 359. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495.   
 360. See 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 249 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph 
Lerner eds., 1987).  
 361. Id.  
 362. Id. at 257 (quoting Charles Turner, Argument and Speech, in 2 THE 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1, 30 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836)); see 3 ELLIOT,  supra, 
at 9 (“Congress might cause the election[] to be held . . . at so inconvenient a 
time . . . as to give them the most undue influence over the choice, nay, even 
to prevent the elections from being held at all—in order to perpetuate 
themselves [in office].” (citation omitted)). 
 363. THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 345 (Alexander Hamilton) (ABA Classics 
ed., 2009).  
 364. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565; see Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 
(1964) (“Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is 
undermined.”). 
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in Part IV.A.4, from the corporate law setting to the legislative 
setting. 
C.  Distinguishing Corporate Fiduciaries from Legislative 
Fiduciaries 
Part III.C noted several distinctions between corporate 
democracy and political democracy, and those distinctions will 
not be repeated here. Scholars have emphasized other 
important distinctions. While acknowledging the historical 
evidence and the conceptual appeal of treating legislators as 
fiduciaries, Seth Davis criticizes the extension of fiduciary 
duties from the private realm—say, corporate law—to the public 
realm and to legislators.365 Assuming that legislators are 
fiduciaries and subject to the classic duties, Davis finds no 
historical support that any breach of those duties by legislators 
was intended to be privately enforceable.366 Moreover, he 
asserts that any enforcement mechanisms were enshrined in 
the Constitution—e.g., ousting via impeachment or by the 
electorate—not generally bestowed on the courts.367 And to the 
extent that the judiciary has a role, Davis envisions its role 
would be limited to invalidating “repugnant” laws, which review 
is not grounded upon classic fiduciary duties.368 As mentioned 
above, if legislation shifted the date of any federal election, such 
legislation would have majority support in both chambers, 
rendering impeachment an impossibility.369 And, if the shift in 
the election date ensured the re-election of the incumbents, then 
the ballot box proves an ineffective check, leaving the judiciary, 
as a co-equal branch, to check mischief.370  
V.  Primary Purpose & Compelling Justification 
In the corporate law setting, the plaintiff-shareholder 
“rarely” establishes that the primary purpose of the directors’ 
 
 365. See Davis, supra note 80, at 1171–78. 
 366. See id. at 1171–73. 
 367. See id. at 1173, 1201. 
 368. See id. at 1176. 
 369. See supra Part 0.  
 370. See supra Part IV.B. 2. 
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action was to impede the shareholders’ franchise.371 Part V.A 
describes several of those rare situations in which courts 
determined that the plaintiff-shareholder did establish such a 
primary purpose, which flipped the burden to the directors to 
establish compelling justification, a difficult, but not impossible, 
onus.372 Part V.B presents concerns of legislator entrenchment 
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in scenarios that map 
onto the corporate law scenarios of Part V.A. It then discusses 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis of such scenarios, as well as 
the resemblance of that analysis to the analysis of courts 
presented in Part V.A.   
A.  Corporate Elections 
When directors authorize an act with a primary purpose of 
impeding the shareholders’ franchise, courts invalidate the act 
unless the directors establish compelling justification for the 
act.373 Altering the date of a vote by shareholders commonly 
invites court scrutiny of the directors’ action.374 Even though the 
directors’ intent—to the extent that a group of individuals may 
act with an intent375—is not specifically at issue,376 directors 
may defend against the plaintiff-shareholder’s allegations by 
referencing legitimate reasons for taking the act.377 Directors 
 
 371. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1130 (Del. 2003).  
 372. See Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 819 (Del. Ch. 2007).  
 373. See Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1132.  
 374. This Article focuses on common law, but any advance or delay of an 
election must comply with pertinent statutory requirements. See, e.g., DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213(a) (West 2020) (providing that record date for 
shareholder’s entitlement to vote at a meeting “shall not be more than 60 nor 
less than 10 days before the date of such meeting”); id. § 222(b) (requiring 
notice of meeting “not less than 10 nor more than 60 days before the date of 
the meeting to each stockholder entitled to vote”).   
 375. Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative 
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992) (“Individuals 
have intentions and purpose and motives; collections of individuals do not.”).   
 376. See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1121–22 (Del. Ch. 
1990) (“[I]nequitable conduct does not necessarily require an evil or selfish 
motive.”). 
 377. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 655 (Del. Ch. 
1988) (concluding that the board expanded its size to impede the shareholders’ 
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may not be forthcoming regarding improper motivations and 
may downplay any disenfranchising purpose.378 Thus, a court 
will focus on the act itself and its effect,379 as well as 
circumstances surrounding the directors’ decision to alter the 
date of the shareholders’ vote, as illuminating of the primary 
purpose of the action.380 Courts have concluded that the primary 
purpose of director action was to impede the shareholders’ 
franchise when: (1) the dissident has, or apparently has, 
assembled a majority voting bloc, and the incumbents delay the 
vote to retain control or to extend their campaign in hopes of 
swinging votes their way; (2) acceleration of the election would 
preclude victory by the dissidents or meaningfully hamper their 
campaign efforts; (3) a delay in the election would invalidate 
previously solicited proxies by the dissident; and (4) the 
incumbent directors act to accelerate or delay the meeting in 
close temporal proximity to the original meeting date.381   
 
franchise, notwithstanding the court’s conclusion that the “addition of Mr. 
Winters, an expert in mining economics, and Mr. Devaney, a financial expert 
employed by the Company, strengthened the Atlas board and, should anyone 
ever have reason to review the wisdom of those choices, they would be found 
to be sensible and prudent”). 
 378. See id. at 656 (“It is difficult to consider the timing of the [board’s 
expansion] . . . as simply coincidental with the pressure that [the hostile 
acquirer] was applying.”).   
 379. See Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376, 
at *11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (“The question of purpose asks for what ultimate 
ends were the acts committed.”). 
 380. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 655–56 (emphasizing that the board’s 
challenged action occurred immediately after the dissidents’ attempt to gain 
control of the corporation). 
 381. Other actions by directors—not directly related to shifting the date of 
an election—may trigger “primary purpose-compelling justification” judicial 
scrutiny. For example, incumbent directors facing defeat at the polls may issue 
outcome-determinative voting shares to parties that support them, triggering 
heightened judicial scrutiny. See Packer v. Yampol, No. 8432, 1986 WL 4748, 
at *1, *9, *15 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1986) (enjoining, during a proxy contest, 
incumbent directors’ issuance of shares (1) to parties that supported the 
incumbent directors, (2) that constituted 44 percent of the total vote, and (3) 
at a price below fair market value, when that issuance delivered a “severe, if 
not fatal, wound upon the [dissidents’] proxy solicitation,” and that issuance 
had the “primary purpose . . . to obstruct [dissidents’] ability to wage a 
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1.  Delay to Retain Control or Extend Campaign 
In political elections, the electorate may vote by absentee 
ballot,382 without visiting a voting booth on election day; 
similarly, shareholders may vote by proxy, without attending 
the shareholders’ meeting.383 To ensure a quorum and in hopes 
of securing support for their recommendations, directors solicit 
proxies in advance of a vote by shareholders.384 During any 
contested campaign, incumbent directors will have a sense of 
whether shareholders support their candidacy, even though 
independent third parties may officially tabulate the votes.385 
Fearing defeat, incumbent directors may delay the meeting to 
extend their control and to extend their campaign, inviting court 
scrutiny upon a shareholder’s challenge. 
In Aprahamian v. HBO & Co.,386 the board, in February 
1987, announced that the annual meeting—at which 
shareholders would elect directors—would be convened on April 
 
meaningful proxy contest in order to maintain themselves in control” (citation 
omitted)); Can. S. Oils, Ltd. v. Manabi Expl. Co., 96 A.2d 810, 813 (Del. Ch. 
1953) (“When the undisputed facts are viewed cumulatively I find it 
reasonably to infer that the primary purpose behind the sale of these shares 
was to deprive plaintiff of the majority voting control.”); Condec Corp. v. 
Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 775 (Del. Ch. 1967) 
In view of the haste with which the [directors issued] . . . 75,000 
new shares, when a substantially smaller number of shares would 
have served the[ir claimed] purpose . . . , I have reached the 
conclusion that the primary purpose of the issuance of such 
shares was to prevent control of [the corporation] from passing to 
[the dissident]. (citation omitted). 
 382. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3001 (West 2020); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 8-400 
(McKinney 2020). 
 383. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (West 2020) (authorizing proxies).   
 384. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (regulating the solicitation of proxies); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (authorizing proxies).   
 385. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 231; see also Aprahamanian v. HBO & 
Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1205 (Del. Ch. 1987) (reporting that the proxy solicitor 
updated incumbent directors of the ongoing vote tally); ExxonMobil Corp., 
Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 5 (Apr. 12, 2018) (“Independent inspectors 
count the votes.”). While one’s “individual vote [may be] kept confidential” 
from the incumbents, no confidentiality is assured regarding an aggregate 
assessment of the ongoing tally. Id. 
 386. 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987).  
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30, 1987.387 In late March 1987, dissident shareholders proposed 
for election a rival slate of nominees, who would explore a sale 
of the corporation, which sale had been opposed by the 
incumbent directors.388 In late April, the incumbent directors 
reversed their position and agreed to explore the possibility of a 
sale of the corporation, but that reversal did not yield adequate 
support from shareholders to assure their re-election.389 So, on 
the eve of the election, with their likely defeat at the polls 
imminent, the incumbent directors postponed the annual 
meeting by almost five months.390 When the postponement was 
challenged, the court concluded that the shareholders 
established that the “election machinery . . . had been 
manipulated,” resulting in the incumbent directors bearing the 
“burden of persuasion to justify their actions.”391 While 
accepting the incumbent directors’ argument that shareholders 
should be informed when they vote, the court ultimately rejected 
their argument that disclosure justified the delayed vote 
because the board had ample time to educate shareholders 
about the rival slate of nominees, and because the incumbent 
directors’ new plan of sale was substantially similar to the 
dissidents’ plan of sale, such that additional time for disclosure 
was not warranted.392 The court preliminarily enjoined the 
directors’ attempt to delay the vote.393   
In Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc.,394 the incumbent 
directors learned, in late March, that their re-election would be 
challenged by the nominees of a dissident shareholder.395 The 
 
 387. Id. at 1205. 
 388. Id.   
 389. Id.  
 390. Id.  
 391. Id. at 1207. 
 392. See id. (“If the incumbent directors were truly sincere in their desire 
to make sure that the stockholders are fully informed before voting, they 
would . . . not have waited until the evening before the meeting date.”). 
 393. Id. at 1209; see MFC Bancorp v. Equidyne Corp., 844 A.2d 1015, 1022 
(Del. Ch. 2003) (ordering incumbent directors to convene a meeting of 
shareholders, when they inequitably delayed a meeting in the face of a 
contested election). 
 394. 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980). 
 395. Id. at 909. 
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corporate bylaws provided for an annual meeting in 
mid-June.396 In mid-April, the incumbent directors amended the 
bylaws to grant themselves discretion to establish the date of 
the annual meeting and to require any dissident shareholder 
that would be proposing nominees for election to provide 
specified information seventy days before the annual 
meeting.397  On August 1, 1980, the board fixed October 3, 1980 
as the date of the annual meeting of shareholders; that is, the 
board established the date of the meeting sixty-three days 
before it was to be held, precluding the dissident from complying 
with the seventy-day notice requirement to initiate a contested 
election.398 The court invalidated the contested bylaw 
amendment.399 Rejecting the incumbent directors’ claimed test 
of “reasonableness” and finding irrelevant their claim that the 
bylaw was not “specifically adopted to thwart the intentions of 
the challenger [as evidenced by] the time and assistance [they] 
afforded [the dissident],”400 the court concluded that the 
directors’ actions, “whether designedly inequitable or 
not, . . . had a terminal effect on the aspirations” of the dissident 
shareholder.401 
In Danaher Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.,402 
dissident shareholders began accumulating shares of a 
corporation, which originally was to have an annual meeting of 
shareholders on May 13, 1986.403 After the dissident 
shareholders acquired a majority of outstanding shares and 
announced their intention to nominate and elect a rival slate of 
candidates for the open board seats, the incumbent directors 
cancelled the shareholder meeting scheduled for May.404 The 
board rescheduled the election for June, but the board 
 
 396. Id.   
 397. Id.   
 398. Id. at 911. 
 399. Id. at 914. 
 400. Id. at 913. 
 401. Id. at 912 (citation omitted). 
 402. No. 86 Civ. 3499, 1986 WL 7001 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1986).  
 403. Id. at *1–2 (interpreting New Jersey corporate law). 
 404. Id. at *2. Because the corporation had a staggered board of directors, 
only three of eight board seats were up for election. Id. 
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revealed—during litigation—that it may postpone the election 
of directors again, perhaps indefinitely.405 Under New Jersey 
corporate law, courts apply “special scrutiny” when directors 
“manipulate the timing of the shareholders’ annual meeting to 
perpetuate [their] reign of control” by “restrict[ing] the ability of 
shareholders to replace them.”406 The court preliminarily 
enjoined the incumbent directors from postponing the annual 
meeting of shareholders from the rescheduled date that they 
had already noticed.407 Delaware courts similarly have struck 
down incumbent directors’ actions to delay the effect of the will 
of the majority of shares, but in the context of shareholders 
taking action outside of a duly-convened meeting.408 
Judicial skepticism extends beyond delayed director 
elections to other delayed votes. In State of Wisconsin 
Investment Board v. Peerless Systems Corp.,409 the board of 
directors convened an annual meeting of shareholders, and 
those directors were re-elected, but a board-sponsored proposal 
would have been defeated by shareholders.410 Rather than 
accept defeat, the board adjourned the meeting without closing 
the polls on that proposal.411 Thirty days later, the board 
reconvened the meeting and secured slim passage for its 
proposal.412 The board delayed the vote to overcome the 
shareholders’ defeat of the proposal, not to increase low voter 
participation, otherwise, the board would have alerted 
 
 405. Id. at *3, *12. 
 406. Id. at *13.   
 407. See id. at *12.   
 408. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (West 2020) (empowering 
shareholders to act by written consent outside of a duly-convened meeting, 
without prior notice, and without a formal vote); Allen v. Prime Comput., Inc., 
540 A.2d 417, 420 (Del. 1988) (finding that a “bylaw whose real purpose is 
delay of shareholder action is per se unreasonable”); Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza 
Sec. Co., 496 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 1985) (striking down a bylaw adopted by 
defendant-directors that arbitrarily delayed shareholder action to “provide the 
incumbent board with time to seek to defeat the shareholder action by 
management’s solicitation of its own proxies, or revocations of outstanding 
shareholder consents”). 
 409. No. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000). 
 410. Id. at *3–4.  
 411. Id. at *4. 
 412. Id. at *5–6. 
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shareholders that the polls remained open and encouraged their 
participation in the vote, which did not occur.413 The directors 
effectively conceded that, if there had been enough votes to 
secure passage of the proposal at the regularly-scheduled 
meeting, then there would have been no adjournment of that 
meeting.414 While not disputing the directors’ good faith nor 
their disinterestedness, the court concluded that the board 
acted with a primary purpose to impede the shareholders’ 
franchise and denied the directors’ motion for summary 
judgment.415 The court expressed doubt that the board could 
establish compelling justification for its actions but allowed it 
the opportunity to do so.416  
An oral ruling by a federal district court reached a similar 
conclusion, applying similar logic, regarding a contested 
acquisition.417 In Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Conrail, Inc.,418 the 
directors of Conrail solicited shareholders to approve the 
corporation’s proposed sale to CSX.419 However, Conrail’s 
directors notified its shareholders that the meeting would be 
convened only if there was sufficient support to approve the 
transaction with CSX, otherwise the meeting would be 
postponed or cancelled.420 The judge orally ruled that Conrail’s 
directors could not “disenfranchise the shareholders by putting 
off a stockholder meeting until [they have] enough support for a 
merger with CSX,” otherwise the meeting and the vote would 
amount to a “sham.”421   
 
 413. Id. at *10–12. 
 414. Id. at *11. 
 415. See id. at *11–12.   
 416. See id. at *19.   
 417. See Frank Reynolds et al., Judge Says Conrail Cannot Delay Merger 
Vote Until It Is Sure that It Will Win, 1997 ANDREWS DEL. CORP. LITIG. REP. 
19611, 19624.   
 418. No. 96-7167, 1997 WL 33463657 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1997). 
 419. See Reynolds et al., supra note 417, at 19624. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. at 19625.  
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2.  Acceleration that Precludes or Hampers the Dissident’s 
Campaign 
Usually, corporate elections to fill director vacancies are not 
contested, as there is usually only one nominee per vacancy.422 
When incumbent directors face a contested election, directors 
may accelerate the date of the vote, which may preclude 
dissidents from attaining any seats on the board or which may 
limit their opportunity to campaign and significantly hamper 
their success in attaining any seats on the board. Courts view 
such actions with skepticism.   
In Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,423 the 
corporation’s bylaws established an annual meeting at which 
shareholders would elect directors for the second Tuesday in 
January.424 In mid-October, almost immediately after the 
incumbent directors learned that dissident shareholders would 
nominate a rival slate of candidates for election to the board, the 
incumbent directors amended the bylaws to accelerate the 
meeting by approximately one month, from early January to 
early December.425 The Chancery Court concluded that the 
incumbent directors “disingenuously resisted the production of 
a list of its stockholders,” which was necessary for the 
dissidents’ campaign, and that the incumbent directors 
accelerated the meeting “for the purpose of cutting down on the 
amount of time which would otherwise have been available to 
[dissidents] for the waging of a proxy battle.”426 The Delaware 
Supreme Court emphasized that dissidents would gear the 
timing of their election campaign to the date set forth in the 
 
 422. See Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: A 
Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 408 (1983) (identifying only 
ninety-six proxy contests over a sixteen-year period, or an average of six proxy 
contests per year); Facebook, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 
14A), at 3 (Apr. 27, 2016) (listing eight nominees for eight vacancies). 
 423. 285 A.2d 430 (Del. Ch.), rev’d, 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). 
 424. Id. at 431–32. 
 425. See id. at 431–32, 434.   
 426. Id. at 434; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219 (West 2020) (requiring a 
corporation to prepare a list of all stockholders entitled to vote at least ten 
days before a meeting to, among other things, allow the dissidents to compete 
for shareholders’ votes).   
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bylaws.427 Because the incumbent directors accelerated the date 
of the vote, the dissidents were “given little chance” to unseat 
the incumbent directors “because of the exigencies of time, 
including that required to clear material at the SEC, to wage a 
successful proxy fight.”428 The Delaware Supreme Court struck 
down the bylaw amendment accelerating the date of the vote 
because the directors “attempted to utilize the corporate 
machinery . . . for the purpose of perpetuating [their time] in 
office . . . and . . . for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate 
efforts of dissident stockholders in the exercise of their rights to 
undertake a proxy contest.”429 Over time, this inquiry from 1971 
evolved to become the “primary purpose-compelling 
justification” inquiry utilized in Delaware and other 
jurisdictions.430   
In Shoen v. AMERCO,431 the District Court of Nevada, 
interpreting Nevada corporate law, adopted Delaware’s 
“compelling justification” standard if the incumbent directors’ 
action had “the primary purpose of interfering with the 
effectiveness of a stockholder vote.”432 Akin to the Schnell case, 
the incumbent directors, in early May, amended the bylaws to 
accelerate the date of the meeting at which shareholders would 
 
 427. See Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439.   
 428. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78n (regulating the solicitation of proxies); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14.a (2020) (same); Filing Review Process, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, https://perma.cc/PN66-XYTS (last modified Sept. 27, 2019) (requiring 
companies to file documents “when they engage in . . . proxy solicitations”). 
 429. Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439 (citation omitted); see Lenahan v. Nat’l 
Comput. Analysts Corp., 310 A.2d 661, 664 (Del. Ch. 1973) (declining to enjoin 
election on claim that dissident lacked sufficient time to solicit proxies, where 
notice of meeting complied with bylaws and dissident belatedly launched 
proxy contest after being dropped from incumbents’ slate of nominees shortly 
before the annual meeting). 
 430. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1131 (Del. 2003) 
(“Accordingly, the incumbent board of directors had the burden of 
demonstrating a compelling justification for that action to withstand enhanced 
judicial scrutiny . . . .” (citation omitted)); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 
564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (assessing whether a board of directors had 
a compelling reason to “validly act for the principal purpose of preventing the 
shareholders from electing a majority of new directors”), vacated by settlement, 
No. CV-N-94-0475, 1995 WL 936692 (D. Nev. Feb. 10, 1995). 
 431. 885 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Nev. 1994). 
 432. Id. at 1341 (quoting Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659). 
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elect directors from September 24 to July 21.433 The incumbent 
directors controlled the corporation because they controlled the 
votes of shares subject to a shareholders’ agreement, which 
included transfer restrictions.434 However, the dissident 
shareholder was arbitrating the validity of the transfer 
restrictions included in that agreement.435 The arbitration was 
expected to be resolved in early September, before the election 
of directors, and, if the dissident was successful in the 
arbitration, then the incumbents likely would have lost control 
of the corporation.436 Fearing that the dissident might succeed 
in the arbitration, the incumbent directors, in late April, caused 
the corporation to seek an order restraining the arbitration, but 
the court rejected the request.437 So, in early May, the 
incumbent directors amended the bylaws to accelerate the 
election by two months.438 By accelerating the date of the 
election, the incumbent directors “narrowed . . . the range of 
choices available” to shareholders, due to the dissident’s 
“consequent inability to campaign.”439 While the court suspected 
that the incumbent directors were aware of the dissident’s 
intent to campaign for board seats at the time of their decision 
to accelerate the date of the election, the court emphasized the 
incumbent directors’ knowledge of the dissident’s attempt to 
terminate the shareholder agreement, and their own failed 
attempt to enjoin the arbitration that could result in a loss of 
the incumbents’ control of the corporation.440 The court rejected 
as pretextual the incumbents’ asserted business justifications 
for accelerating the date of the election,441 and concluded that 
they “advanced [the vote] for the purpose of interfering with the 
free and fair voting by the shareholders, . . . afraid that they 
 
 433. Id. at 1341–42. 
 434. Id. at 1336. 
 435. Id. at 1336–37. 
 436. See id. at 1338.   
 437. Id. 
 438. Id. 
 439. Id. at 1342.   
 440. Id. at 1343–44. 
 441. Id. at 1342–44. 
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would lose an election” if held as originally scheduled.442  Given 
that the dissident shareholder carried his burden, the 
incumbents were required to establish “compelling 
justification,” but they offered “no justification that [was] 
convincing, let alone compelling.”443 
3.  Alteration of the Meeting Date Would Invalidate Proxies 
Though some shareholders attend the annual meetings at 
which directors are elected, shareholders generally do not 
attend such meetings, and instead, they vote by proxy.444  
Altering the meeting date could invalidate the dissident’s 
previously solicited proxies, which consequently invites court 
scrutiny.445   
In Aprahamian v. HBO & Co.,446 discussed in Part V.A.1, 
the court enjoined the incumbent directors’ attempt to further 
postpone the annual meeting of shareholders by five months.447 
The court expressed concern regarding the impact of delay upon 
the proxies that had already been solicited by the dissident 
shareholders.  
 
 442. Id. at 1344. 
 443. Id. at 1355; see id. (enjoining the meeting to allow solicitation of 
proxies); see generally Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 
1194–95 (Del. 2010) (en banc) (preventing insurgent from amending the 
bylaws to accelerate the date of the annual meeting by approximately eight 
months, where the board served staggered terms and the applicable statute 
contemplated each election would be separated by about one year). 
 444. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (West 2020); see also John D. Stoll, 
Are Annual Meetings Still Necessary?, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2015, 4:03 PM), 
https://perma.cc/XGU4-RAQ6 (“GM’s annual meeting [of shareholders] took 
place with less than three dozen attendees . . . . Influential investors aren’t 
showing up.”). 
 445. In 2019, Facebook, Inc. solicited proxies that contemplated the 
possibility of an adjournment or postponement, but not an advancement of the 
scheduled meeting date. Facebook, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 
14A), at 74 (Apr. 12, 2019) (“The undersigned hereby appoints David . . . and 
Colin . . . , as proxy holders . . . to vote . . . [at] the Annual Meeting of 
Stockholders, to be held on May 30, 2019 . . . and at any adjournments or 
postponements thereof.” (emphasis added)).   
 446. 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
 447. See id. at 1205. 
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[They] expended considerable sums of money on th[e] proxy 
contest. If the meeting [had been] postponed, arguably, the 
proxies solicited and returned in good faith by the 
stockholders w[ould have] become void and a postponement 
may well [have] defeat[ed] the[ir] efforts . . . and the will of 
the majority of the stockholders. Irreparable harm may be 
assumed in such a case.448 
In Gintel v. Xtra Corp.,449 the court distinguished 
Aprahamian and authorized a brief delay of the annual meeting 
of shareholders at which directors would be elected.450 The court 
emphasized that, while the directors in Aprahamian sought a 
five-month delay, the incumbent directors in Gintel sought only 
a thirty-day delay, and the court approved only a fifteen-day 
delay.451 Moreover, in Aprahamian, the incumbent directors 
would have had to set a new “record date” that jeopardized the 
validity of previously solicited proxies, while in Gintel, “the 
same record date [was] preserved [and] the proxies . . . in hand 
[remained] effective.”452 
Relatedly, courts are less troubled by a delayed election 
when the parties have not yet commenced competing for 
shareholders’ votes, as there would be no invalidation of any 
proxies and any such delay is less likely to have a primary 
purpose of impeding the shareholders’ franchise. In Stahl v. 
Apple Bancorp,453 the incumbent directors intended to hold the 
election for directors in mid-May, and they, in mid-March, 
established the “record date,” which, in turn, established the 
fifty-day timeframe within which the election would be held.454 
In late March, the dissident shareholder alerted the incumbent 
 
 448. Id. at 1208. 
 449. No. 11422, 1990 WL 1098684 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 1990). 
 450. See id. at *1. 
 451. See id. at *1, *3 (concluding that a fifteen-day delay appropriately 
balanced the shareholders’ interest in reviewing new information while also 
preventing the incumbent board from negotiating a transaction before the 
shareholder meeting). 
 452. Id. at *1. 
 453. 579 A.2d 1115 (Del. Ch. 1990). 
 454. Id. at 1119 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213 (West 2020) (“[T]he 
board of directors may fix a record date, which . . . shall not be more than 60 
nor less than 10 days before the date of such [a] meeting [of shareholders].”)). 
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directors of his intent to nominate a rival slate of candidates and 
to acquire the company by a tender offer.455 Soon thereafter, and 
before specifying the election date, the incumbent directors 
withdrew the record date, thereby enabling them to hold the 
election later than originally intended; but, they did so not with 
a primary purpose to forestall the election of directors—instead 
they sought additional time to explore an alternative 
transaction to the one proposed by the dissident.456 As the 
primary purpose of the delay was not to impede the 
shareholders’ franchise, the “compelling justification” standard 
was not implicated.457 Because no meeting date had been set and 
because no proxies had been solicited, the delayed meeting did 
not impair the shareholders’ franchise.458 The court was 
comforted by the temporal separation between the board’s act 
and the originally intended meeting date.459 
4.  Temporal Proximity Between the Directors’ Action and the 
Meeting Date 
Closeness in time between the board’s act to alter the date 
of an election and the election itself invites judicial scrutiny.460 
The DGCL once required that the bylaws establish the date on 
which directors would be elected and also barred any change of 
that date within sixty days of the election.461 The purpose of that 
former statutory provision was to “insure against a sudden 
change” of the date of the election.462 Though the Delaware 
legislature subsequently eliminated the statutory bar to last 
 
 455. Id. at 1117. 
 456. Id. at 1119–20, 1122–23.   
 457. See id. at 1124 (applying the intermediate scrutiny of Unocal and 
finding that the incumbent directors’ action passed muster). 
 458. See id. at 1123.   
 459. Id. at 1125 (“As one moves closer to a meeting date and closer to the 
announced conclusion of a contested election, attempts to postpone a meeting 
would likely require a greater and greater showing of threat in order to justify 
interfering with the conclusion of an election contest.”). 
 460. See id. 
 461. See In re Tonopah United Water Co., 139 A. 762, 764 (Del. Ch. 1927) 
(citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 1944 (1915)). 
 462. See id.  
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minute changes of the date of the directors’ election,463 common 
law may bar such changes.   
Closeness in time between an originally scheduled vote and 
the directors’ decision to change the date of the vote, standing 
alone, may not justify application of the “compelling 
justification” standard.464 Nonetheless, such closeness in time 
will arouse a court’s suspicions. “As one moves closer to a 
meeting date and closer to the announced conclusion of a 
contested election, attempts to postpone a meeting would likely 
require a greater and greater showing . . . to justify interfering 
with the conclusion of an election contest.”465 In Aprahamian v. 
HBO & Co.,466 the directors waited until the eve of the meeting 
date before attempting to postpone the election, which attempt 
was enjoined.467 While directors and courts favor an informed 
vote, the court doubted that “the incumbent directors were truly 
sincere in their desire to make sure that the stockholders [were] 
fully informed before voting,” otherwise the delay could have 
been announced earlier, as opposed to the eve of the election, 
when they learned of their likely defeat.468 Similarly, in Condec 
Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co.,469 the court invalidated director 
action taken in close temporal proximity to the meeting, which 
action had a disenfranchising effect.470 
B.  Political Elections 
When addressing voting rights cases, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has articulated concerns that mirror certain of those 
identified and addressed by courts in the corporate law setting: 
incumbent entrenchment, limitation of voter choice by 
limitation on dissident candidates and dilution of blocs of voters. 
 
 463. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (West 2020).   
 464. See Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Operating Co., No. 11902, 1991 WL 
1182611, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991) (“[D]elay alone [does not] 
produc[e] . . . irreparable harm.”). 
 465. Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1124–25 (Del. Ch. 1990). 
 466. 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
 467. Id. at 1208–09.  
 468. Id. at 1207.   
 469. 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967). 
 470. Id. at 775.   
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In addressing those concerns, the justices have resorted to 
various theories when addressing partisan legislative action 
that insulates incumbents from challengers, including the 
association and free speech rights under the First Amendment, 
the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and more abstract structural 
principles of democracy.471 Moreover, the justices have applied 
levels of review ranging from strict scrutiny to rational basis.472 
Regarding the Court’s analysis in voting rights cases, there is 
“little sense of an organizing principle.”473 Part V.B.1 addresses 
those areas that raise judicial concern in both corporate 
elections and political elections. Part V.B.2 addresses the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s analysis in voting rights cases that present 
issues of entrenchment and notes similarities between that 
analysis and the analysis of Delaware courts when addressing 
allegations regarding entrenching actions by corporate 
directors.  
1.  Entrenching Political Incumbents 
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed concern 
that political incumbents may legislate to entrench themselves 
 
 471. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 356–60 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (applying structural principles of democracy); Norman v. Reed, 502 
U.S. 279, 288 & n.8 (1992) (applying rights derived from the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, but specifically not applying the Equal Protection 
Clause); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (applying the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
 472. See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 
184–85 (1979) (requiring that state legislation that imposed signature 
requirements that varied by office to further “compelling interest” by “least 
drastic means”); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973) (upholding 
legislation that delayed enrollment in a political party because it was “tied to 
a particularized legitimate purpose, and [was] in no sense invidious or 
arbitrary”). 
 473. Pildes, supra note 22, at 39; see id. at 97 (“[L]egal academics and 
many judges . . . are better trained to think in terms of rights, participation, 
representation, and quality than in terms of material issues of political 
power.”).  
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or members of their party.474 While, in the corporate setting, the 
Delaware courts have addressed the issue of incumbent 
directors strategically altering the date of an election to 
entrench themselves in office,475 the U.S. Supreme Court has 
not addressed a similar scenario involving federal legislators. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has addressed other 
legislative action that entrenches incumbent politicians in 
scenarios like those addressed by Delaware courts with respect 
to entrenching action by incumbent corporate directors.476 
a.  Limitation of Voter Choice by Limitation on Dissident 
Candidates 
In the corporate setting, shareholders typically are not 
presented with alternatives to the corporation’s own nominees 
to fill director vacancies; typically, there is only one nominee per 
vacancy.477 So, in the atypical situation, when a dissident 
shareholder proposes a rival slate of nominees to fill director 
vacancies, the incumbent directors—who seek re-election—may 
take action that limits the choices available to shareholders. As 
discussed in Part V.A, courts review such actions by incumbent 
directors with skepticism.   
In the political setting, citizens generally are presented 
with two candidates (a Republican and a Democrat), but either 
or both of those parties may take action to limit the choices 
available to citizens by limiting the participation of third-party 
 
 474. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 
U.S. 787, 791 (2015) (criticizing partisan legislative action that “subordinate[s] 
adherents of one political party and entrench[es] a rival party in power”); 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419 (2006) 
(criticizing partisan legislative action that “entrenches an electoral minority”); 
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 439 (1971) (criticizing partisan legislative 
action that “freeze[s] the status quo”); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 
2484, 2509 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (criticizing partisan legislative action 
that “enable[s] politicians to entrench themselves in office as against voters’ 
preferences”). 
   475. See supra Part 0. 
 476. See, e.g., Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184 (protecting voters’ 
rights by invalidating legislation limiting ballot access).  
 477. See Facebook, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 
3 (Apr. 27, 2016) (listing eight nominees for eight vacancies). 
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candidates.478 The Supreme Court has viewed such actions with 
skepticism.479 Importantly, the Court has protected voters, who 
suffered a legal harm when the legislature took action that 
limited a dissident’s access to the ballot as an infringement on 
voters’ rights.480   
Whether in a corporate election or a political election, the 
courts have struck down regulations that preclude a dissident 
candidate from appearing on the ballot. Consider first a 
corporate election. In Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc.,481 the 
incumbent directors crafted a bylaw that required any dissident 
shareholder to notify the corporation “x” number of days before 
the election of the dissident’s nominees, but the incumbent 
directors announced the date of the election less than “x” days 
before the election was to occur, entirely precluding the 
shareholders’ consideration of the dissident’s nominees.482 The 
court refused to enforce the bylaw, which “had a terminal effect 
on the aspirations” of the dissident shareholder.483 Turning to 
the political realm, in Williams v. Rhodes,484 the Supreme Court 
struck down state election laws that made it “virtually 
 
 478. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (criticizing regulations 
that “give the two old, established parties a decided advantage over any new 
parties”). 
 479. See Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184 (“Restrictions on access 
to the ballot burden two distinct and fundamental rights, ‘the right of 
individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right 
of qualified voters . . . to cast their votes effectively.’”); Williams, 393 U.S. at 
24 (finding that the state failed to show any compelling interest to justify its 
burden restricting new political parties’ placement on the ballot). 
 480. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983) (“Our primary 
concern is with the tendency of ballot access restrictions ‘to limit the field of 
candidates from which voters might choose.’” (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 
U.S. 134, 143 (1972))); Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184 (“By limiting 
the choices available to voters, the State impairs the voters’ ability to express 
their political preferences.”).   
 481. 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980). 
 482. Id. at 911.   
 483. Id. at 912. 
 484. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
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impossible” for a new political party to have its candidates 
placed on the ballot.485  
If incumbent politicians accelerate the date of an election to 
hamstring the campaign efforts of any challengers, then those 
incumbent politicians will deprive the voters of information 
about those challengers, effectively limiting the voters’ choices, 
which should invite judicial scrutiny.486 
b.  Dilution 
Under corporate law, incumbent directors cannot dilute the 
will of a majority of shares by, for example, issuing additional 
shares.487 Similarly, “in the original malapportionment 
cases, . . . judicial review was necessary to ensure 
majoritarianism.”488 “[W]hen qualified voters elect members of 
Congress, each vote [is] to be given as much weight as any other 
vote . . . .”489 “To say that a vote is worth more in one district 
than in another . . . run[s] counter to . . . fundamental ideas of 
democratic government . . . .”490 The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly expressed concern about legislative action that 
 
 485. Id. at 24; see id. at 31 (criticizing regulations that “give the two old, 
established parties a decided advantage over any new parties”). Nonetheless, 
whether in a corporate election or a political election, the courts have 
permitted an early notification process by which the incumbents and the 
voters may learn about new candidates when the process does not 
meaningfully limit the dissident candidate’s appearance on the ballot. See 
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434–35 (1992) (upholding bar on write-in 
candidates because of the relative ease by which dissidents may appear on 
ballots); Openwave Sys. Inc. v. Harbinger Cap. Partners Master Fund I, Ltd., 
924 A.2d 228, 238–39 (Del. Ch. 2007) (upholding advance notice bylaw). 
 486. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“The first instinct of power is the retention of 
power, and under a Constitution that requires periodic elections, that is the 
best achieved by the suppression of election-time speech.”). 
 487. See Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 776 (Del. Ch. 
1967); Can. So. Oils, Ltd. v. Manabi Expl. Co., 96 A.2d 810, 813 (Del. Ch. 1953).   
 488. Pildes, supra note 22, at 72; see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 
2484, 2513–14 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Partisan gerrymandering 
operates through vote dilution— the devaluation of one citizen’s vote as 
compared to others . . . .”). 
 489. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).   
 490. Id. at 8. 
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dilutes one’s voting power.491 Legislative action should not 
render votes that would otherwise constitute a majority as 
insufficient to carry the election.492 
Will third-party aggregators of information enable 
increasingly accurate predictions of election outcomes that 
approach prescience?493 Will technological advancements result 
in the populace voting, perhaps by phone application, prior to 
the election date?494 As legislators gain access to likely election 
outcomes prior to the elections themselves, will those legislators 
act so as to upset an anticipated, unfavorable outcome?495 If, 
fearing defeat as the election drew near,496 incumbent 
legislators altered the date of the election and secured their 
re-election, then the legislative action would effectively dilute 
the votes that would have comprised a majority (and would have 
supported opposition candidates) during the regularly 
scheduled election. This would enhance the voting power of 
those voters who did support the incumbents and did comprise 
a majority at the time of the rescheduled election. True, the 
legislation would not directly dilute (or enhance) anyone’s vote, 
 
 491. See id. at 7 (“The apportionment statute thus [impermissibly] 
contracts the value of some votes and expands that of others.”); Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a 
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote . . . .”); Gray v. Sanders, 
372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963) (“How . . . can one person be given twice or 10 times 
the voting power of another person in a statewide election merely because he 
lives in a rural area or because he lives in the smallest rural county?”). 
 492. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 559 (“[L]egislatures may not . . . give some 
voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than others.”); Gray, 372 
U.S. at 379–81 (striking down a state election scheme where one who secures 
the most counties secured the vacant seat, even though that candidate may 
not have secured a majority of votes). 
 493. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2511–13 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the effects of advancements in computer technology on 
gerrymandering). 
 494. Cf. Mobile Passport Control, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://
perma.cc/B5DZ-7E5K (last updated June 17, 2020, 3:35 PM) (discussing a 
phone application that dispenses with the need for paperwork upon re-entry 
to the United States). 
 495. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000) (barring disparate 
review of voters’ intent during recount, due to risk of partisan manipulation 
controlling the election outcome). 
 496. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 35 (1968) (acknowledging 
last-minute concerns, especially with respect to absentee voters). 
Cleveland.Final .docx (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  4:45 PM 
1546 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1463 (2020) 
 
but courts review the effect of legislation, and its effect would be 
dilutive. Diluting the vote by stuffing the ballot box is illegal.497 
Delaying an election to enable additional favorable votes, 
though technically permissible, should be met with judicial 
skepticism, like in the corporate setting.498   
c.  Absentee Voting 
In the corporate setting, shareholders may vote by proxy 
without attending the meeting at which the election is held.499 
Similarly, states commonly allow qualified voters to vote 
in-person before the date of the election and by absentee ballot 
without visiting a voting booth on the day of the election.500 In 
the corporate setting, courts view with skepticism action by 
incumbent directors that invalidates shareholders’ proxies.501 If 
federal legislators accelerate the date of a federal election, but 
not well in advance of that election, such action could limit the 
window in which voters could qualify for absentee voting.502 If 
federal legislators delay the date of a federal election, but not 
well in advance of that election, such action might invalidate 
absentee ballots.503 Courts should scrutinize federal legislative 
action that invalidates votes that would have been valid but for 
the legislation action.504 Federal legislators, however, could 
likely skirt such dire consequences. The Constitution empowers 
 
 497. See United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 389 (1944); Ex parte 
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 378 (1879). 
 498. See supra Part 0.  
 499. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(b) (West 2020) (authorizing proxies).   
 500. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3000–3001, 3017–3018 (West 2020) 
(addressing vote-by-mail); N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 8-400, 8-600 (McKinney 2020) 
(addressing early in-person voting and vote-by-mail).   
 501. See supra Part 0. 
 502. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3001 (requiring application for absentee ballot 
be submitted “between the 29th and 7th day prior to the election”); N.Y. ELEC. 
LAW § 8-400(d) (requiring the state to mail an absentee ballot to eligible voters 
“not earlier than the thirtieth day nor later than the seventh day before the 
election”).  
 503. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3001 (requiring application for absentee ballot 
be submitted “between the 29th and 7th day prior to the election”).   
 504. See Michael T. Morley, Election Emergencies: Voting in the Wake of 
Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks, 67 EMORY L.J. 545 (2018). 
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federal legislators not only to specify the date of federal 
elections, but also to specify the manner of holding federal 
elections.505 Thus, regarding a new election date, Congress could 
legislate a safe harbor for votes that would have been valid when 
cast in connection with the original election date.   
2.  Analyzing Entrenching Legislation 
When addressing entrenching legislation in voting rights 
cases, the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis somewhat resembles 
the analysis employed by Delaware courts when addressing 
directors undertaking entrenching action. Though the U.S. 
Supreme Court considers the right to vote to be a fundamental 
right,506 and though the Court, in earlier decisions, applied strict 
scrutiny to infringement of that right,507 the Court’s analysis 
generally has become less demanding.508 Only if legislation 
subjects voting rights to “severe” restrictions must that 
legislation be narrowly drawn to advance a compelling 
governmental interest; legislation that imposes “reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory” restrictions on voting rights generally will 
be upheld as furthering governmental regulatory interests.509   
Recall the analysis of Delaware courts: if the action by 
incumbent directors had a primary purpose of impeding an 
effective vote by shareholders, then the incumbent directors 
 
 505. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The times, places and manner of 
holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each 
state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make 
or alter such regulations . . . .”). 
 506. See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 
184 (1979) (emphasizing that “voting is of the most fundamental significance 
under our constitutional structure”); Williams, 393 U.S. at 30 (emphasizing 
that the right to vote “rank[s] among our most precious freedoms”); Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (describing the right to vote as a 
“fundamental political right”). 
 507. See Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184–85 (requiring that state 
legislation further a “compelling interest” by “least drastic means”).  
 508. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432–34 (1992) (“[T]o subject 
every voting regulation to strict scrutiny . . . would tie the hands of States 
seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.”). 
 509. Id. at 434; see Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).  
Cleveland.Final .docx (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  4:45 PM 
1548 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1463 (2020) 
 
must establish compelling justification for their action.510 The 
U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis embraces components of that 
corporate law analysis. First, those courts do not simply protect 
the hollow act of voting. Instead, the electorate must enjoy an 
“effective” right to vote.511 For example, neither shareholders 
nor citizens would enjoy “effective” voting rights if their votes 
were diluted or if dissidents were precluded from the ballot.512 
Second, those courts acknowledge that rules are necessary to 
ensure fair elections free of fraud and to avoid an endless array 
of frivolous candidates.513 Consequently, those courts are 
prepared to give credence to such rules without subjecting them 
to heightened scrutiny.514 For example, because incumbents and 
voters should have an opportunity to learn about dissident 
candidates, rules that require advance notice of their candidacy 
are enforceable.515 Incumbent directors and legislators are given 
leeway to regulate elections.516 Third, however, as voting 
 
 510. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1130 (Del. 2003); 
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660–61 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 511. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (discussing “the right 
of qualified voters . . . to cast their votes effectively”); Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 
440 U.S. at 184 (same); Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 787 (“vote[] effectively”); 
Blasius Indus., Inc., 564 A.2d at 660–61 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“[C]orporate acts 
intended primarily to thwart effective exercise of the [shareholders’] 
franchise . . . [will be invalidated absent] . . . compelling justification.”). 
 512. See supra Part 0. 
 513. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[A]s a practical 
matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair 
and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the 
democratic processes.”); Openwave Sys. Inc. v. Harbinger Cap. Partners 
Master Fund I, Ltd., 924 A.2d 228, 239 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that advance 
notice bylaws “permit orderly meetings and election contests and . . . provide 
fair warning [that allows] sufficient time to respond”). 
 514. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432 (“Petitioner proceeds from the erroneous 
assumption that a law that imposes any burden upon the right to vote must 
be subject to strict scrutiny. Our cases do not so hold.”); id. at 433 (“[T]o subject 
every voting regulation to strict scrutiny . . . as petitioner suggests, would tie 
the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and 
efficiently.”); MM Cos., 813 A.2d at 1130 (noting that heightened scrutiny is 
“rarely” applied).  
 515. See supra notes 485–486 and accompanying text.  
 516. See Storer, 415 U.S. at 730 (“It is very unlikely that all or even a large 
portion of the state election laws would fail to pass muster under our cases.”); 
Openwave Sys. Inc., 924 A.2d at 239 (upholding advance notice bylaw).   
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restrictions become more severe, those courts require 
rule-makers to establish “compelling” justification for those 
restrictions.517 The U.S. Supreme Court’s test expressly 
references the concept of narrow tailoring, and, in practice, the 
Delaware courts impose a similar requirement, even though the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s test does not expressly reference 
narrow tailoring.518 Fourth, those courts focus upon the purpose 
and effect of legislation, not the legislators’ motivations.519 
Legislators’ motivations, though not the focus, may inform a 
court’s inquiry into purpose.520 The corporate law inquiry into 
“primary purpose” is consistent with the proposals of election 
law scholars.521  
 
 517. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (requiring that “severe” restrictions be 
narrowly drawn to advance the governmental interest of “compelling” 
importance); MM Cos., 813 A.2d at 1129 (“compelling justification”). 
 518. See Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992) (requiring that severe 
restrictions must be “narrowly drawn to advance a [governmental] interest of 
compelling importance”); Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 810 
(Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that the challenged action must be “reasonably 
necessary to advance a compelling . . . interest”).   
 519. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 24 (invalidating legislation because it was 
“virtually impossible” for dissidents to appear on the ballot, without inquiring 
into legislators’ intent); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“It 
is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down 
an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative 
motive.”); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2516 (2019) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (“[B]y requiring plaintiffs to make difficult showings relating to 
both purpose and effects, the standard invalidates the most extreme, but only 
the most extreme, partisan gerrymanders.”); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp Inc., 579 
A.2d 1115, 1121–22 (Del. Ch. 1990) (“[I]nequitable conduct does not 
necessarily require an evil or selfish motive.”). 
 520. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2517 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“But when 
political actors have a specific and predominant intent to entrench themselves 
in power by manipulating district lines, that goes too far.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
541 U.S. 267, 318 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen partisanship is the 
legislature’s sole motivation—when any pretense of neutrality is forsaken 
unabashedly . . . the governing body cannot be said to have acted 
impartially.”); id. at 350 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I would, however, treat any 
showing of intent in a major-party case as too equivocal to count unless the 
entire legislature were controlled by the governor’s party (or the dominant 
legislative party were vetoproof).”). 
 521. Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 175 (2008) (proposing analysis that requires 
consideration of the “predominant effect of directly burdening individual 
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VI.  Extending the Corporate Inquiry to the Legislative Setting 
In the corporate setting, when incumbent directors act with 
a primary purpose of impeding the shareholders’ franchise, then 
the incumbent directors must establish compelling justification 
for their action.522 Courts have applied the inquiry to situations 
in which incumbent directors strategically shifted the date of an 
election.523 What if a court extended the inquiry from corporate 
law to the legislative setting when incumbent legislators 
strategically altered the date of an election? Part IV.A applies 
the inquiry to a few basic scenarios. Part IV.B briefly sketches 
out related issues that merit deeper consideration than space 
allows.   
A.  Three Scenarios 
This Part sets forth three basic scenarios. In the corporate 
setting, the demands of fiduciary duties vary with the context, 
requiring courts to make detailed factual findings, which, if 
varied slightly, could significantly impact any conclusion.524 
Slightly varying the facts of the basic scenarios below could 
easily vary the outcome.   
As mentioned at the beginning of this Article, incumbent 
politicians in the House and in the Senate have proposed many 
bills over the years that would shift federal elections from 
Tuesday in early November to a weekend (Saturday and 
Sunday) in early November.525 Each of those bills was proposed 
by a Democrat, so there may be a partisan advantage 
 
voters”); Hasen, supra note 347, at 846 (“[C]ourts should primarily examine 
the effect of election laws on the rights of individuals . . . .”); id. at 846 (“[P]roof 
of . . . bad [legislative] intent should be neither necessary nor sufficient for an 
election law challenge to succeed, though it should be relevant in getting 
courts to take a hard look at election laws.”); Pildes, supra note 22, at 76 
(“[L]aws whose sole or predominant purpose is political self-entrenchment, of 
incumbents or parties, should be unconstitutional in principle.”).   
 522. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1118 (Del. 2003).   
 523. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 440 (Del. 1971).   
 524. See supra notes 446–452 and accompanying text (emphasizing factual 
distinctions between Aprahamian, in which the court enjoined the board’s 
action, and Gintel, in which the court upheld the board’s action).   
 525. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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motivating this proposed shift.526 Most people do not work on 
the weekend; most people, however, work on Tuesday. Even 
though most states require employers to allow employees time 
away from the jobsite to vote, many states do not impose this 
requirement on employers.527 For that reason, among other 
reasons, many eligible voters do not vote in federal elections.528 
So legislators may attempt to increase voter participation, 
which is generally accepted as a positive goal.529 Assume that 
such a bill was enacted shortly after a federal election, so that 
its practical impact was almost two years away. Increasing 
voter turnout appears to be the primary purpose of shifting 
federal elections from Tuesday to the weekend.530 It may be that 
(1) increased voter turnout favors Democrats, or (2) the primary 
purpose of the legislation is not realized, because people may 
favor leisure on the weekend over voting, and because people 
may have been willing to vote on Tuesday to take time away 
from their jobs, but those two considerations are largely beside 
the point.  So long as the primary purpose was not to impede 
effective voting, a court would not apply heightened scrutiny.531 
Moreover, the court would not focus on the primary purpose of 
the legislation without considering its actual effect,532 and its 
 
 526. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 527. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14000 (West 2020); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3-110 
(McKinney 2020); Jacey Fortin, Why Only Some Workers Get Time Off to Vote 
on Election Day, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/T55D-VLKL.  
 528. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES tbl.9 at 12 (2012) (indicating approximate voting-age population of 235 
million in 2010), with FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2012 (July 
2013) (indicating total votes of approximately 129 million in the presidential 
election of 2012). 
 529. Arian Campo-Flores, Kentucky’s New Governor Restores Voting 
Rights to Nonviolent Felons, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc
/3447-EDYM (last updated Dec. 12, 2019, 4:03 PM) (“We have a moral 
responsibility to protect and extend the right to vote . . . .” (quoting Ky. Gov. 
Andy Beshear)). 
 530. See Fortin, supra note 527.    
 531. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 428 (1992) (“Where the burden 
on voters’ rights is slight, the state need not establish a compelling interest to 
tip the constitutional scales in its direction.”). 
 532. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974) (“We must, therefore, 
inquire as to the nature, extent, and likely impact of the California 
requirements.”).   
Cleveland.Final .docx (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  4:45 PM 
1552 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1463 (2020) 
 
actual effect seemingly would not impede citizens’ ability to vote 
effectively, as citizens had ample notice of, and time to adjust 
to, the new election date.   
While the first example involved a shift well in advance of 
any election, the next two examples involve last-minute shifts 
in the date of the election. Assume that, as a federal election 
drew near, U.S. intelligence agencies discovered evidence that 
foreign nationals violated our campaign laws and corrupted our 
states’ election machinery.533 Those developments led Congress 
to amend the U.S. Code to delay the election to allow the impact 
of the illegal messaging to dissipate and to allow debugging of 
election machinery. Congress feared that proceeding with the 
election as originally scheduled would have produced results not 
reflective of the electorate’s true intentions, perhaps impacted 
by illegal campaigning. Here, it seems that the primary purpose 
of the legislation was to disenfranchise the electorate in early 
November by displacing the majority’s will at that time. Given 
that primary purpose, a court would review the challenged 
legislation under heightened scrutiny.534 Nonetheless, on these 
bare facts, the court likely would conclude that the government 
had a compelling interest in ensuring that the election was not 
tainted by fraud.535 Limited court relief might be appropriate, 
as infringements on the right to vote must be tailored to the 
extent necessary.536 A delayed election may not be necessary in 
some states if those states’ election machinery had not been 
 
 533. See Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot to Subvert an Election, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018) https://perma.cc/6TEG-4U3B (discussing the 2016 
Russian attacks on the United States’ presidential election); see generally 
Morley, supra note 504 (addressing election delays in the case of emergencies). 
 534. See Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992) (applying strict 
scrutiny to legislation that “severely” restricts voting rights). Of course, a court 
might conclude that a nondiscriminatory, broadly applicable law that briefly 
delayed an election did not “severely” restrict voting rights, but simply 
inconvenienced voters. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 
U.S. 181, 205–06 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).  
 535. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[A]s a practical 
matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair 
and honest . . . .”); Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191 (plurality) (acknowledging 
governmental interest in “protecting the integrity and reliability of the 
electoral process”).   
 536. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.    
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hacked and their citizens had not been subjected to illegal 
campaigning.  
The third scenario also involves a last-minute delay in the 
date of the election, where the incumbents’ defeat was imminent 
and where they collectively and boldly asserted partisan reasons 
for “rigging” the election to ensure their re-election.537 The 
primary purpose of the legislation would trigger heightened 
scrutiny and, on these bare facts, the incumbents have offered 
no compelling justification for the delayed election.  
B.  Other Considerations 
1.  Private Enforcement 
Some scholars generally would oppose private enforcement 
of duties imposed on federal legislators because the U.S. 
Constitution expressly empowers other actors to police straying 
legislators.538 When legislators breach their duties, the 
Constitution expressly contemplates policing by the co-equal 
branches, by colleagues through impeachment, and by voters at 
the polls.539 However, the President, if aligned with the 
incumbents who enacted entrenching legislation, would refuse 
to police any such breach by refusing to veto the legislation. 
Impeachment is a non-starter, given that the challenged 
legislation passed both chambers with majority support. And, 
 
 537. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“[I]t is unfortunate that our legislators have reached the point of 
declaring that, when it comes to apportionment: ‘We are in the business of 
rigging elections.’” (quoting John Hoeffel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away 
from Easy Election, WINSTON-SALEM J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B1)).   
 538. See Davis, supra note 80, at 1174 (describing the Framers’ views on 
impeachment); Miller & Gold, supra note 65, at 554–55  
Fiduciary accountability under governance-type 
mandates . . . do[es] not imply a correlative claim right that is 
enjoyed and may be asserted by a right holder in her personal 
capacity . . . . [T]he undefined and contingent nature of individuals’ 
beneficial interests in governance mandates makes it impossible to 
recognize individuated claims rights in them. 
 539. Davis, supra note 80, at 1174 (“Impeachment . . . was the principal 
punitive measure associated in the public mind with an official’s breach of 
trust.”); id at 1175 (“[T]he ballot box provides an additional remedy for a 
legislator’s derogation of political duties.”).   
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the premise is that legislators ensured their re-election, 
emasculating discipline by voters. That leaves the judiciary as 
the source of any potential relief.540 And someone must appeal 
to the judiciary. Given that the challenged legislation infringes 
on a citizen’s right to vote at a regularly scheduled election, a 
citizen should be able to seek relief.541 In Rucho, a citizen’s right 
to vote was impaired by dilution, yet the Court concluded that 
the claim was non-justiciable; however, the Court emphasized 
that the states were able to act, and some states had already 
acted, to remedy the citizen’s concerns.542 In contrast to Rucho, 
the states would be preempted by federal legislation that altered 
the date of a federal election.543   
2.  Judicial Relief 
Assuming the existence of such duties, some scholars would 
generally oppose judicial enforcement of the fiduciary duties of 
 
 540. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2523 (2019) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (“[P]oliticians’ incentives conflict with voters’ interests, leaving 
citizens without any political remedy for their constitutional harms.” (quoting 
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1941 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring))); 
Issacharoff, supra note 231, at 165 (“[C]onstitutional 
courts . . . typically . . . overs[ee] . . . the electoral process itself, reaching in 
many cases to election administration . . . and electoral challenges.”).  
 541. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 375 (1963) (“[A]ny person whose 
right to vote is impaired, has standing to sue.” (citations omitted)); United 
States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220, 227 (1918) (“The right to vote is 
personal . . . .”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) (same) (quoting 
Bathgate, 246 U.S. at 227).   
 542. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507–08 (majority opinion). 
 543. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in 
each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”); id. art. VI (“[T]he laws of the 
United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the land . . . .”). 
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federal legislators.544 Though similar in certain respects,545 the 
Rucho Court’s non-justiciable conclusion is distinguishable with 
respect to crafting a remedy.546 Regarding Rucho’s partisan 
gerrymandering, the state legislature periodically must re-draw 
federal districts, given the Malapportionment Cases,547 and the 
federal courts are ill-equipped to draw those districts.548 If, 
however, federal legislators violated the Constitution by 
altering the date of a federal election, a court would not be 
required to identify a new date for the election;549 the court could 
simply bar the effect of the legislation that otherwise would 
 
 544. See Davis, supra note 80, at 1171–78 (“To the extent that the 
Founders thought of judicial review of legislative action in private law terms, 
there is strong evidence they would have looked to the corporate law doctrine 
of repugnancy rather than to private fiduciaries’ duties of loyalty and care.”); 
Gerken & Kang, supra note 80, at 89. (“There is a world outside the 
judiciary  . . . .”). But see FRANKEL, supra note 73, at 256 (“Doctrinally, equity 
is the source of the remedies for violations of fiduciary obligations, because 
fiduciary obligations originated in the English equity courts.”); Morley, supra 
note 504, at 586–95 (addressing judicial review). 
 545. Just as the judiciary may lack competence to determine whether 
politics played too great of a role when state legislators drew a federal district, 
so too may the judiciary lack competence to determine whether politics played 
too great of a role when the federal legislature shifted the date of a federal 
election. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2549 (“[F]ederal courts are not equipped to 
apportion political power as a matter of fairness, nor is there any basis for 
concluding that they were authorized to do so.”).  
 546. See id. (“The question here is whether there is an ‘appropriate role for 
the Federal Judiciary’ in remedying the problem of partisan 
gerrymandering—whether such claims are claims of legal right, resolvable 
according to legal principles, or political questions that must find their 
resolution elsewhere.” (quoting Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1920 (2018))). 
 547. See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 375 (1963).   
 548. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2549 (“[F]ederal courts are not equipped to 
apportion political power as a matter of fairness, nor is there any basis for 
concluding that they were authorized to do so.”).  
 549. Cf. Ocilla Indus., Inc. v. Katz, 677 F. Supp. 1291, 1302 (E.D.N.Y. 
1987) (“[C]onfusion . . . could ensue if another date were arbitrarily selected 
by the court . . . .”). 
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have shifted the date of a federal election.550 Elegantly crafted 
relief would not be necessary.551 
VII. Conclusion 
Notwithstanding federal legislators’ constitutional 
authority to shift the date of a federal election, courts should 
review any such shift with skepticism. Delaware courts have 
long viewed with skepticism any action by corporate directors to 
alter the date of a vote by shareholders.552 A rich body of 
corporate law—which reflects entrenchment concerns 
previously articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
legislative setting—provides a helpful analog.553 The analog is 
consistent with a growing body of scholarship that recognizes 
federal legislators as fiduciaries, like corporate directors, and 
 
 550. See MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 93 
(Farrand ed., 1966) (“A law violating a constitution established by the people 
themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void.”); FRANKEL, 
supra note 73, at 245 (“[W]hen the fiduciaries’ actions are devious and 
self-interested the courts will interfere.”); id. at 249 (discussing injunctions as 
relief for breach of fiduciary duties); Amar, supra note 74, at 1434 (analogizing 
government officials to corporate officers and concluding that any limits 
imposed by the charter could be enforced by courts); Pildes, supra note 22, at 
84 (“[C]ourts are . . . better at vetoing exercises of governmental power than 
at mobilizing power affirmatively.”). The reach of any such injunction could be 
a contentious issue. See Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” 
Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920, 993–1008 (2020)). A claim for damages 
would fail. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton) (ABA 
Classics ed., 2009) (“[T]he members of [the Senate] should be exempt from 
punishment for acts done in a collective capacity . . . .”); Davis, supra note 80, 
at 1201–03 (rejecting remedies for breach of fiduciary duty, but mentioning 
disgorgement, restitution, punitive damages, and removal from office, not 
injunctions).  
 551. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 354 (2004) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“To devise a judicial remedy . . . it is not necessary to . . . [furnish] 
a precise measure of harm caused by divergence from the ideal in each case.”); 
id. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts should be able to 
identify . . . unjustified entrenching in power of a political party that the 
voters have rejected . . . . And they should be able to design a remedy for 
extreme cases.”). 
 552. See supra Part 0. 
 553. See supra Part 0.   
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 554. See supra Part 0.  
